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COOPER V. DUPNIK: CIVIL LIABILITY FOR
UNCONSTITUTIONAL INTERROGATIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
Custodial interrogations often invite police misconduct because they
tend to occur in private, closed settings.' Ultimately, police try to dominate
the interrogation by isolating suspects in restricted, sterile rooms, with only
detectives and the suspect present.2 Often the police design the atmosphere
to intimidate suspects and make them feel helpless.3 The interrogation may
involve anything from psychological tactics to physical violence. 4 Although
such methods raise questions as to the appropriateness of interrogation,
police argue that interrogation is an essential tool in criminal investigation 5
because the suspect is often the only person who knows any details of the
crime.6 When dealing with claims of unconstitutional interrogations, courts
I. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966) (noting that majority of interro-
gations take place incommunicado); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514 (1963) (noting
that police use secret interrogations to extort confessions from suspects); Yale Kamisar, Equal
Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure, in POLICE INTER-
ROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS 27, 28 (1980) (arguing that police officers often use tactics during
custodial interrogations that they would hesitate to use in front of others).
2. See FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 29 (3d ed.
1986) (suggesting that interrogations take place in private, quiet room with no distractions).
3. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455 (noting that police tactics during interrogation attempt
to take advantage of suspect's weaknesses); Haynes, 373 U.S. at 514 (noting that police use
techniques of secret and incommunicado interrogation to extort confessions from suspects);
Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 407 (1945) (describing interrogation in which police
questioned suspect while he was naked to instill fear in suspect); Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d
1220, 1224 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (describing police department's choice of interrogator known
to instill hopelessness in suspects for investigation of serial-rape), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 407
(1992); INBAU ET AL., supra note 2, at 24 (arguing that principal factor leading to successful
interrogations is privacy).
4. See Rogers v. R:chmond, 365 U.S. 534, 536 (1961) (describing police interrogation
in which interrogators threatened to imprison suspect's wife unless he confessed); Brown v.
Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 282 (1936) (involving police who whipped suspects during interro-
gation until they confessed to murder). See generally INBAU ET AL., supra note 2 (advocating
range of psychological techniques depending upon facts of each case).
5. See Haynes, 373 U.S. at 515 (noting that courts must permit police interrogation of
suspects because interrogation is crucial tool for law enforcement); INBAU ET AL., supra note
2, at XIV (stating that police can solve many crimes only with information from suspect,
either in form of confession, admission, or further information); Kamisar, supra note 1, at
28 (noting that police and prosecutors insist that they need privacy of custodial interrogations
to strengthen their cases); Lawrence Herman, The Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and
the Good Old Days of Police Interrogation, 48 Omo ST. L.J. 733, 736 (1987) (admitting that
confessions are crucial to solving some crimes).
6. See Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1226 (describing unlawful interrogation plan devised by task
force because task force had little evidence on series of rapes); INBAU Er AL., supra note 2,
at XIV (noting that police can solve many crimes only by obtaining confessions).
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should not hamper police in their pursuit of criminals with the fear of civil
liability,7 but because of the ease with which police can transgress a suspect's
constitutional rights during custodial interrogation, strong remedies to deter
such conduct are essential.'
Although the exclusionary rule bars the use of unconstitutional confes-
sions at trial, 9 the rule alone cannot deter police misconduct.'0 First, the
suspect may never go to trial, making the exclusionary rule unavailable."
Second, if the suspect does go to trial, the prosecution may introduce
voluntary statements that the police obtain in violation of Miranda v.
Arizona12 for impeachment purposes at trial.' 3 Therefore, if suspects invoke
their Miranda rights, the police have some incentive to continue questioning
the suspects in a noncoercive manner, in hopes of limiting the suspects'
ability to testify at trial. 14 If the police do use coercive tactics during
interrogation, the statement they obtain is inadmissible, at trial for all
purposes," although a court's admission of an involuntary statement is
7. See Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort
Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. Rav. 641, 651 (1987) (noting that courts are aware of threat of
personal liability for individual police officers and adjust principles of civil liability accordingly).
8. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 232 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting
that impeachment exception to Miranda rule will undermine deterrence of police misconduct
during interrogation).
9. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 396 (1978) (stating that prosecution cannot
constitutionally introduce involuntary confessions at trial); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
444 (1966) (holding that prosecution may not introduce statements at trial unless police obtained
them using safeguards to protect suspect's rights under Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination
Clause); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320 (1959) (noting that because involuntary
confessions violate Due Process Clause, they are inadmissible at trial).
10. See Harris, 401 U.S. at 232 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that impeachment
exception to exclusionary rule may encourage police to interrogate suspect in violation of
Miranda); Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1225 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (involving police
attempt to elicit voluntary statements from suspect after suspect invoked right to counsel,
because potential use of such statements at trial for impeachment would keep suspect from
testifying), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 407 (1992).
11. See Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1223 (involving unlawful interrogation of suspect whom
police later released and never charged with any crime); Thornton v. Buchmann, 392 F.2d
870, 874 (7th Cir. 1968) (holding that only significance of statement police obtain in violation
of Miranda is that court must exclude it from trial).
12. 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see infra note 48 (discussing holding of Miranda).
13. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1971) (holding that prosecution may
use voluntary statements police obtain in violation of Miranda for impeachment at trial).
14. See id. at 225-26; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479,(1966) (stating that
prosecution may use no evidence against suspect at trial that police obtain from suspect without
Miranda warnings and waiver). In Harris the Supreme Court held that the prosecution could
use statements that police obtained in violation of Miranda to impeach the defendant, provided
that the statements were not actually involuntary. Harris, 401 U.S. at 225. In his dissent,
Justice Brennan argued that this impeachment exception gives the police incentive to violate
Miranda to obtain a voluntary statement that the prosecution can use to impeach the suspect.
Id. at 232. Brennan implied that use of the statements for impeachment would encourage the
defendant not to testify in his own defense. Id. at 232.
15. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978) (noting that prosecution may not
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subject to harmless error analysis.' 6 Because courts' exclusion of improperly
obtained statements will not sufficiently deter such police misconduct in all
instances, other methods of deterrence are appropriate.
17
A cause of action for civil damages under section 1983 of the United
States Civil Rights Acts may act as an additional deterrent.' 8 To establish
a section 1983 cause of action, suspects must show that the police, acting
under color of state law, deprived them of a constitutional right during the
interrogation. 9 Plaintiffs typically allege a constitutional violation under the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination or the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause, because these constitutional provisions
traditionally have governed police behavior during interrogations. 20 Courts
use involuntary statements at trial for any purpose); Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1247
(9th Cir.) (en banc) (reiterating that impeachment exception applies only to voluntary state-
ments), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 407 (1992).
16. See Arizona v. Fulminante, I11 S. Ct. 1246, 1251 (1991) (stating that courts should
apply harmless error analysis to trial court's admission of involuntary confessions).
17. See Harris, 401 U.S. at 232 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that impeachment
exception sends message to police that they can ignore Miranda's safeguards in attempt to
keep suspect from testifying on his own behalf); Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1225 (involving deliberate
police plan to unlawfully interrogate suspect to keep suspect from testifying in his own defense
and to eliminate insanity defense).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
19. See id. (requiring that defendant, acting under color of state law, deprive § 1983
plaintiff of right under Constitution); Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1236 (noting that viability of § 1983
suit depends on whether defendants deprived plaintiff of constitutional right). Courts may
protect the police through the doctrine of qualified immunity if the courts had not clearly
established the legal standards the police violated at the time of the constitutional violation.
Id. at 1251. See generally Alfredo Garcia, The Scope of Police Immunity from Civil Suit
Under Title 42 Section 1983 and Bivens: A Realistic Appraisal, 11 WHITTIR L. REv. 511
(1989) (noting that Supreme Court's interpretation of qualified immunity doctrine presents
§ 1983 plaintiff with nearly insurmountable barrier to obtaining damages from individual police
officers); Kit Kinports, Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Cases: The Unanswered Questions,
23 GA. L. REa. 597 (1989) (arguing that courts must balance their desire to protect public
officials from fear of personal liability by granting qualified immunity with purposes of
§ 1983). This Note will not discuss actions by federal agents, because § 1983 does not address
such actions.
20. See Cooper v. Dupnik, 924 F.2d 1520, 1529 n.17 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that Supreme
Court uses Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and Due Process Clause to
analyze coerced confessions), rev'd, 963 F.2d 1220 (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 407
(1992). The Fifth Amendment provides in part that "[n]o person ... shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. The Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause provides, "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or propery, without due process of law." Id. amend XIV, § 1.
In 1936 the Supreme Court began analyzing confessions under the Due Process Clause
19931 1193
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have allowed section 1983 claims based on the Due Process Clause, 2' but
until recently courts had not allowed section 1983 claims based on the Fifth
Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause as interpreted by the Miranda deci-
sion.22
of the Fourteenth Amendment, because it had not yet applied the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination to the states. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1936); see
infra note 198 (discussing holding of Brown). The test the Court developed over the next 30
years focused on the voluntariness of the suspect's confession. Herman, supra note 5, at 746-
47. Any statements had to be the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice. Id.
This standard was a compromise between disallowing all statements police obtain during
interrogations and admitting all statements made under any circumstances. Id. This compromise
standard allows the police to interrogate suspects so long as the police do not cross the line.
The problem with the standard is that the definition of voluntariness is vague and gives little
guidance for determining when police behavior goes to far. Id.
The Supreme Court provided more protection for interrogated suspects in 1964 in Massiah
v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). The Massiah Court held that, once the police begin
formal proceedings against a suspect, the suspect's Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches.
Id. at 205. The Sixth Amendment provides in part that "li]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S.
CoNsT. amend. VI. If the police formally charge a suspect and then interrogate the suspect,
they must honor the suspect's request for counsel or courts may not admit any resulting
statements at trial. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206. However, the Massiah Court focused on the
proper operation of the adversary system, not on the suspect's Fifth Amendment privilege.
Herman, supra note 5, at 743. Because of this focus on the adversarial system, Massiah's
protections apply only after police demonstrate their intention to prosecute the suspect. Id.
Because most interrogations occur before police begin formal judicial proceedings against a
suspect, Massiah's protections attach too late to protect most suspects. Id.
A few months after Massiah, the Supreme Court again addressed the admissibility of
confessions police obtained during interrogation in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
In Escobedo, the Court held that the trial court could not admit a statement the police
obtained after ignoring a suspect's request for counsel when the suspect was the focus of the
police criminal investigation. Id. at 490-91. The Court's basis for the holding was the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, but the language of the opinion suggested that the Court's true
concern was with the suspect's Fifth Amendment privilege. Id. at 488-89.
During the same term as Escobedo, the Court applied the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination to the states in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964). Two years
later the Court decided Miranda, formally holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege protects
suspects during custodial interrogations. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.i 436, 467 (1966); see
infra note 48 (discussing holding of Miranda). Since Miranda, the Cou has continued to use
the voluntariness analysis developed in Brown. See Cooper, 924 F.2d at 1529 n.17 (noting that
courts analyze allegedly coerced confessions under Due Process Clause due to historical
accident). The Court now analyzes violations of the Fifth Amendment privilege by using the
Miranda holding and the presumption of coercion during custodial interrogations. Id. The
Court uses the due process voluntariness analysis to address claims of actual coercion. Id. In
addition, the due process standard protects suspects from police questioning in situations
outside the scope of Miranda. See Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1252-53 (analyzing suspect's
allegedly coerced confession under Due Process Clause, even though Miranda's procedural
safeguards did not apply because police did not question suspect during custodial interrogation).
21. See infra note 182 (citing cases in which courts have allowed § 1983 claims, based
on the Due Process Clause, for confessions which the police coerced).
22. See Cooper, 924 F.2d at 1527 (noting that no court has allowed § 1983 claims based
on Miranda violations because Miranda requirements are not constitutionally based).
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In Cooper v. Dupnik,23 a recent opinion by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the court expanded the potential application
of section 1983 suits to unlawful interrogations by allowing a section 1983
cause of action for violations of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.24 In addition, the Cooper court determined that a due process
violation for police coercion is complete with the coercive interrogation,
25
and the court found that deliberately unlawful police behavior "shocks the
conscience" and is therefore actionable under section 1983 as a violation
of substantive due process.
26
The Cooper court found a prima facie case under section 1983 on three
constitutional theories. 27 First, the Cooper court found a section 1983 cause
of action under the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination clause because the
police coerced Cooper, in an attempt to elicit a confession, after ignoring
his request for an attorney. 21 This decision marked the first time a court
found a section 1983 cause of action for violation of the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination during interrogation.29 The Cooper de-
cision highlights the existing disagreement over whether a section 1983 claim
arises at the time of interrogation 0 or if the prosecution must introduce at
trial evidence the police obtained during questioning for a constitutional
violation to be complete2' Second, the court found a section 1983 violation
23. 963 F.2d 1220 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
24. See Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1237 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (holding that § 1983
plaintiff stated cause of action because police ignored his request for counsel, thereby violating
suspect's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 407
(1992).
25. See id. at 1244 (holding that Constitution prohibits police from coercing statements
from suspects).
26. See id. at 1250 (holding that deliberate police plan to violate suspect's Miranda rights
shocked conscience).
27. Id. at 1237.
28. Id. at 1242.
29. See, e.g., Davis v. City of Charleston, 827 F.2d 317, 322 (8th Cir. 1987) (deciding
that police failure to inform suspect of Miranda rights did not deprive suspect of constitutional
right); Bennett v. Passic, 545 F.2d 1260, 1263 (10th Cir. 1976) (holding that no rational
argument exists for allowing § 1983 claim for failure to inform suspect of Miranda rights);
Thornton v. Buchmann, 392 F.2d 870, 874 (7th Cir. 1968) (finding police failure to inform
suspect of Miranda rights not actionable under § 1983).
30. See Mahoney v. Kesery, 976 F.2d 1054, 1062 (7th Cir. 1992) (recognizing view that
Constitution forbids police from coercing confession whether or not prosecution introduces
confession at trial); Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1245 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (noting that
use of coerced statement is not necessary for constitutional violation), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
407 (1992); Duncan v. Nelson, 466 F.2d 939, 945 (7th Cir.) (allowing § 1983 cause of action
solely for damages arising from unlawful interrogation and confession), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
894 (1972).
31. See Mahoney, 976 F.2d at 1061-62 (acknowledging existence of view that only
prosecution's use of coerced confessions is unconstitutional); Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1253
(Brunetti, J., dissenting) (arguing that no § 1983 cause of action exists when prosecution
introduces no statements in criminal proceeding); Johnson v. Whalen, No. 91-C-3138, 1991
WL 278297, at *3 (N.D. I1. Dec. 26, 1991) (holding that police coercion following suspect's
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based upon the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because
the police obtained the statement through coercion. 32 The distinction, if
any, between this cause of action and the Fifth Amendment self-incrimi-
nation cause of action is unclear.33 Finally, the court found a section 1983
claim based upon a substantive violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment because the police behavior shocked the con-
science.34 The difference between the two claims based on the Due Process
Clause also is unclear.3 5
The Cooper court's analysis of the three section 1983 theories raises
questions about the future scope of section 1983 actions for unlawful
custodial interrogations.16 Although the court's holding expands the potential
for section 1983 actions in the context of interrogations, the decision contains
language that likely will limit its impact. 37 Given courts' perception that
request for counsel is not actionable under § 1983 because no constitutional violation exists
unless prosecution makes use of statement); Jackson v. Dillon, 518 F. Supp. 618, 621 (E.).N.Y.
1981) (noting that until court allows prosecution to introduce involuntary statement at trial no
constitutional violation exists); Ransom v. City of Phila., 311 F. Supp. 973, 974 (E.D. Pa.
1970) (same).
32. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1248; see also supra note 20 (quoting language of Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause).
33. See, e.g., Govan v. Chicago Police Dep't, No. 90-C-3471, 1991 WL 38695, at *2
(N.D. I11. Mar. 18, 1991) (analyzing suspect's allegations of coerced confession under Fifth
Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause); Laurence A. Benner, Requiem for Miranda: The
Rehnquist Court's Voluntariness Doctrine in Historical Perspective, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 59, 148
(1989) (discussing relationship between Fifth Amendment compulsion and due process coercion);
Joseph D. Grano, Selling the Idea to Tell the Truth: The Professional Interrogator and Modern
Confessions Law, 84 MICH. L. Rnv. 662, 687-88 (1986) (reviewing FRED E. INBAU ET AL.,
CRmm!AL INTERROGATION AND COmNSSIONS (1986)) (arguing that Fifth Amendment compulsion
is same as due process coercion); Arnold H. Loewy, Police-Obtained Evidence and the
Constitution: Distinguishing Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence From Unconstitutionally
Used Evidence, 87 MICH. L. REv. 907, 933-34 (1989) (arguing that statements police obtain
from Miranda violations under Fifth Amendment are not unconstitutionally obtained, while
some statements that are coerced under the Due Process Clause are unconstitutionally obtained);
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. Cm. L. Ray.1 435, 440-46 (1987)
(contending that due process violations occur only when police break suspect's will, while
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, as interpreted by Miranda, is not so
limited).
34. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952) (finding that police behavior
that shocks conscience violates due process); Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1248 (noting that suspects
may sue under § 1983 for police conduct that violates due process because it shocks conscience);
infra note 209 (discussing holding of Rochin).
35. See Duncan v. Nelson, 466 F.2d 939, 944 (7th Cir.) (holding that involuntary
confessions are actionable under § 1983 because police behavior offends standards of decency
and fairness), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 894 (1972); Loewy, supra note 33, at 934 (noting that
distinction between police behavior merely resulting in coerced confessions is difficult to
distinguish from police behavior which is actionable under § 1983 because behavior is uncon-
stitutional on its own).
36. See Mahoney v. Kesery, 976 F.2d 1054, 1062 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting Cooper court's
broad interpretation of Self-Incrimination Clause).
37. See Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1244 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (stating that police
failure to respect suspect's invocation of Miranda rights is not actionable under § 1983 unless
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section 1983 suits are too common and often frivolous38 and the United
States Supreme Court's recent limitations on some section 1983 causes of
action,3 9 courts probably will interpret Cooper narrowly by focusing on the
decision's limiting language rather than the decision's broader potential.4
Courts should not expand section 1983 claims based on the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination and the Miranda decision, despite the
potential to do so after the Cooper decision. 41 Rather, courts should address
intentionally unlawful police behavior during interrogations under the shock-
the-conscience standard, using the Cooper court's expansive interpretation
of the standard.
42
II. Cooper v. Dupnik
In Cooper v. Dupnik, the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc considered
whether to uphold the district court's grant of a motion for summary
judgment in a section 1983 action based on an allegedly unconstitutional
accompanied by coercive behavior), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 407 (1992); see also Becerril v.
Kidd, Nos. 90-16370, 91-15095, 1992 WL 207930, at *2 (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 1992) (dismissing,
in unreported decision subsequent to Cooper, § 1983 claim based on police failure to read
suspect Miranda warnings); Haupt v. Dillard, 794 F. Supp. 1480, 1489 (D. Nev. 1992)
(dismissing § 1983 claim based on violation of Miranda rights because, unlike Cooper, police
did not coerce or treat plaintiff improperly in any way, but only ignored his request for
counsel).
38. See Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 395-96 (1987) (noting that many
§ 1983 suits are marginal and frivolous and burden on officials defending them is great);
Barnier v. Szentmiklosi, 565 F. Supp. 869, 874 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (noting that in 1983, 16.5%
of all civil cases in federal courts were civil rights claims, although not necessarily brought
under § 1983), rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1987). But see Eisenberg & Schwab, supra
note 7, at 694 (concluding from empirical study that courts' false perception of § 1983 suits
as frivolous and burdensome arises because such suits are more time consuming and expensive
than other types of suits, while success rate is lower).
39. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393 (1989) (disallowing § 1983 plaintiff
from using substantive due process claim for police use of excessive force during arrest);
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986) (rejecting substantive due process theory for
§ 1983 claims of police use of excessive force in postconviction context, in favor of Eighth
Amendment cruel and unusual punishment analysis); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543
(1981) (holding that courts may allow § 1983 claims brought under procedural due process
only if no adequate state remedy exists), overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.
327 (1986). See generally Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 7, at 644-52 (arguing that perception
of § 1983 suits as flooding federal courts and being frivolous has shaped emerging judicial
doctrines limiting potential § 1983 liability).
40. See Mahoney, 976 F.2d at 1062 (acknowledging Cooper court's expansive interpre-
tation of Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, but declining to address
soundness of interpretation); Haupt, 794 F. Supp. at 1489 (finding no § 1983 cause of action
for mere police failure to respect suspect's request for counsel during interrogation because
police did not follow failure to honor request with coercive behavior).
41. See infra notes 137-43 and accompanying text (discussing Cooper court's potential
expansion of § 1983 claims due to police failure to respect suspect's Miranda rights).
42. See infra notes 224-28 and accompanying text (discussing appropriateness of shock-
the-conscience standard for addressing § 1983 claims of unlawful police conduct during
interrogation).
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interrogation. 43 The case involved a task force, made up of police officers
from the Tucson Police Department and the Pima County Sheriff's De-
partment, formed to catch the "Prime Time Rapist."' 44 The police believed
the Prime Time Rapist was responsible for a series of rapes, robberies, and
kidnappings in the Tucson area from 1984 through 1986.41 The task force
decided, before it focused on a suspect, that when it arrested a suspect it
would interrogate him until he confessed, even if the suspect invoked his
right to counsel or his right to remain silent under Miranda v. Arizona.46
In 1986 the task force, misinformed by erroneous fingerprint
analysis, arrested Michael Cooper. 47 Although the task force advised
Cooper of his Miranda rights, 48  it did so in a superficial




46. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (holding that police must provide
suspects with certain procedural safeguards during custodial interrogations to protect Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination); Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1224. The task force's
preconceived plan included choosing an interrogator even before it had a suspect for the rapes.
They selected a detective known for his confrontational "hammering" technique and his ability
to instill a sense of hopelessness in the suspect. Id. The task force's plan was well known to
supervisors in the police departments, who did not object to it. Id. at 1227. In addition,
evidence existed that the Pima County Sheriff's Department generally encouraged such behavior
when dealing with crimes involving public safety concerns. Id.
47. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1228; see Dee Ralles, Right to Sue OK'd in Rape Mix-Up,
Atiz. REPuBmac, May 7, 1992, at B4 (discussing Ninth Circuit's ruling allowing Cooper to sue
police for damages for his treatment during interrogation). Mr. Cooper was the second suspect
the police arrested for the series of rapes. John David Harrell was the first suspect the task
force questioned. Like Cooper, he invoked his right to counsel, and the police also ignored
his request. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1226. The task force finally closed the case when Brian
Larriva, the actual rapist, killed himself as the police came to arrest him. Ralles, supra, at
B4.
48. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (requiring that police advise suspect of right to remain
silent and right to counsel prior to custodial interrogation); Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220,
1228 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 407 (1992). In Miranda the Supreme Court
considered the admissibility of statements that prosecutors obtain from suspects during custodial
interrogations. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 439. In each of the interrogations at issue in Miranda,
the police interrogated the suspect in a room where the suspect was isolated from the outside
world. Id. at 445. The Miranda Court first determined that the atmosphere of isolation
combined with a police-dominated atmosphere was inherently coercive, even in the absence of
physical intimidation. Id. at 457. Next, the Miranda Court held that the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination is not limited to the courtroom, but applies to any setting
where the police curtail the suspect's freedom of action. Id. at 467. The Court then specified
that to negate the coerciveness of such interrogations, the police must inform the suspects that
they have the right to remain silent, that any statement they make may be used against them
at trial, and that they have the right to have an attorney, either retained or appointed, present
during the questioning. Id. at 444. The Court did specify that the Constitution did not mandate
such warnings and that the states were free to devise alternative safeguards to protect the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 467. Finally, the Court stated that the
prosecution could not use any statements at trial that the police obtained from suspects without




fashion.49 During his interrogation, Cooper repeatedly asked to have his
attorney present and expressed his unwillingness to speak with his inter-
rogators. 50 Despite these requests, the detectives continued the interro-
gation for four hours, with Cooper at one point sobbing and stating he
was "breaking down."'- The task force held Cooper incommunicado for
twenty-four hours before realizing its mistake and releasing him.
52
In 1987 Cooper filed suit against members of the task force in the
United States District Court for the District of Arizona.53 Cooper alleged
nine counts under state tort law5 4 and nine counts under section 1983,
including the denial of his right to remain silent.5 The district court denied
summary judgement for the task force members on the right to remain
silent claim, but a panel for the Ninth Circuit reversed and dismissed for
failure to state a cause of action. 6 On rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit
upheld the district court's denial of summary judgment on the right to
remain silent claim and remanded the case for trial.
5 7
The Cooper court determined that the plaintiff made out a prima facie
case under section 1983 on three theories.58 As a preliminary step, the court
found that although Cooper never actually confessed, he made incriminating
statements that could support a constitutional violation. 9 Next, the Cooper
49. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1228. The police officer reading the Miranda rights from a card
jokingly offered to read Cooper his driver's license instead. Id.
50. Id. at 1229.
51. Id. at 1231.
52. Id. at 1233.
53. Id. at 1234. Cooper sued for damages, alleging that following his arrest and
interrogation, he and his family were evicted from their home, he was fired from his job, and
he suffered injury to his business and personal reputation. Cooper v. Dupnik, 924 F.2d 1520,
1525 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 963 F.2d 1220 (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 407 (1992).
Evidence also existed that Cooper suffered from post-traumatic stress syndrome as a result of
the interrogation. Id. at 1524.
54. Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1234 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 407 (1992). Mr. Cooper's nine state tort claims, which were not at issue on appeal, were
false arrest, malicious prosecution, defamation, false-light invasion of privacy, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, trespass, conversion, negligence, and conspiracy. Id.
55. Id. Mr. Cooper based his nine § 1983 claims upon false arrest, false imprisonment,
improper training and procedures, injury to reputation and property interests, invasion of
privacy, two counts of illegal search and seizure, conspiracy, and denial of right to counsel
and right to remain silent. Id. Only the claim of the right to remain silent was at issue on
rehearing. Id. at 1235.
56. See id. at 1236 (noting that original Ninth Circuit panel dismissed Cooper's claim
because prosecution never used Cooper's statements at trial, Cooper never confessed to rapes,
task force's behavior did not shock conscience, and police were entitled to qualified immunity).
57. See id. at 1237 (holding that Cooper had established prima facie case under § 1983
under multiple theories).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1238. During his interrogation, Cooper admitted that he occasionally slapped
his wife. In addition, Cooper acknowledged that he sometimes left his home, unaccompanied,
at night, often for hours at a time. This admission was particularly incriminating because the
rapes always occurred at night. Id. at 1236-37; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
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court analyzed the task force's behavior under the Fifth Amendment priv-
ilege against self-incrimination and under two Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process theories, to determine if section 1983 liability was appropriate. 60
III. MISCONDUCT LEADING TO SECTION 1983 LIBmTY
A section 1983 remedy is not available for every type of police miscon-
duct that occurs during interrogation. 6' The behavior must rise to the level
of a constitutional violation.62 While not every infraction will result in civil
liability for police officers, 6 courts disagree on when misconduct goes
beyond a mere procedural violation and becomes an infringement on a
suspect's constitutional rights."
Traditionally, section 1983 provides three potential claims for police
misconduct during interrogations. 65 The first claim arises from a violation
476 (1966) (holding that prosecution can use no statements police obtain in violation of
safeguards, whether statements are confessions or are merely incriminating); Griffin v. Strong,
983 F.2d 1540, 1542 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting that Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination protects against all compelled statements, regardless of their degree of incrimi-
nation).
60. Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1238-50 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 407 (1992).
61. See Mahoney v. Kesery, 976 F.2d 1054, 1060 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that not every
tort committed by public officers is actionable under § 1983); Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1256
(Brunetti, J., dissenting) (criticizing court's decision for departing from § 1983 requirement
that constitutional violation exist because deplorable police misconduct swayed court).
62. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) (holding liable parties who deprive citizen of constitu-
tional right while acting under color of state law); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394
(1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979)) (noting that first inquiry in
§ 1983 suit is to determine alleged constitutional violation).
63. See, e.g., Warren v. City of Lincoln, 864 F.2d 1436, 1442 (8th Cir.) (finding that
police failure to give Miranda warnings and refusal to honor request for counsel during
interrogation is not Fifth Amendment violation), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1091 (1989); Davis v.
City of Charleston, 827 F.2d 317, 322 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that police failure to give
Miranda warnings is not constitutional violation); Bennett v. Passic, 545 F.2d 1260, 1263 (10th
Cir. 1976) (finding that failure to give Miranda warnings does not rise to level of constitutional
tort); Thornton v. Buchmann, 392 F.2d 870, 874 (7th Cir. 1968) (deciding that remedy for
police failure to give Miranda warnings is court's exclusion of statements from trial); O'Hagan
v. Soto, 523 F. Supp. 625, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that interrogator's failure to allow
suspect to contact counsel or to end interrogation after request for counsel is not actionable
under § 1983 as Fifth Amendment violation); Chrisco v. Shafran, 507 F. Supp. 1312, 1317,
1320-21 (D. Del. 1981) (finding no § 1983 cause of action under Fifth Amendment for police
failure to give Miranda warnings or refusal to allow presence of counsel during interrogation).
64. See infra notes 82-94 and accompanying text (noting overlap and confusion between
potential § 1983 claims for unlawful police behavior during interrogation).
65. See Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (analyzing § 1983 claim
for allegedly unlawful confession on grounds that police violated suspect's Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, that police coerced statement in violation of Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause, and that police behavior shocked conscience in violation of
substantive due process), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 407 (1992).
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of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and courts base
it on the United States Supreme Court's holding in Miranda.6 Miranda
requires that police use procedural safeguards to protect a suspect's Fifth
Amendment privilege during custodial interrogation. 7 Although courts ex-
clude from trial statements the police obtain in violation of Miranda," they
have been reluctant to hear section 1983 claims based on such violations. 69
The second type of section 1983 claim arises under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.7 0 Courts deem statements that the
police coerce from suspects during interrogation to be involuntary71 and
exclude involuntary statements from trial for all purposes.7 2 The police
misconduct that leads to the involuntary statement also may be actionable
under section 1983.71 Courts, however, disagree on whether the harm ad-
66. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (requiring police to inform suspect
of certain rights before custodial interrogation); Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1242 (finding § 1983
cause of action for police violation of Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
because of police failure to respect suspect's invocation of Miranda rights).
67. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45 (requiring that police warn suspects of certain rights
before interrogation); supra note 48 (discussing Miranda holding).
68. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (stating that prosecution may not use statements at
trial unless police obtained them in accordance with Miranda safeguards). But see Harris v.
New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1971) (noting that prosecution may use voluntary statements
police obtain in violation of Miranda to impeach defendant's credibility at trial).
69. See supra note 63 (citing cases finding no § 1983 cause of action for Miranda
violations).
70. See supra note 20 (quoting Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment).
71. See, e.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320 (1959) (holding that prosecution's
use of coerced, involuntary confessions violates traditional principles of Fourteenth Amend-
ment).
72. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978) (holding that prosecution may not
use involuntary statements for any purpose at trial); Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1247
(9th Cir.) (en banc) (emphasizing that impeachment exception is limited to voluntary state-
ments), ceri. denied, 113 S. Ct. 407 (1992).
73. See Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1248 (allowing § 1983 claim to proceed because police
behavior that elicited involuntary confessions violated due process); Gray v. Spillman, 925
F.2d 90, 94 (4th Cir. 1991) (allowing § 1983 suit for police extraction of involuntary confession);
Rex v. Teeples, 753 F.2d 840, 843 (10th Cir.) (holding that plaintiff could sue police under
§ 1983 for extracting involuntary confession), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 967 (1985); Duncan v.
Nelson, 466 F.2d 939, 945 (7th Cir.) (allowing plaintiff opportunity to prove damages at
§ 1983 trial for harm inflicted during interrogation), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 894 (1972). But
see Jackson v. Dillon, 518 F. Supp. 618, 621 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that merely obtaining
involuntary statement is not per se constitutional violation, and does not lead to § 1983
liability); Ransom v. City of Phila., 311 F. Supp. 973, 974 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (holding that no
§ 1983 liability exists for police coercion of involuntary statement unless prosecution introduces
statement at trial).
If the court mistakenly allows the prosecution to introduce an involuntary confession at
trial, no § 1983 cause of action for harm suffered as a result of the admission will exist.
Duncan, 466 F.2d at 942. The Duncan court noted that police may rely on a trial court
properly excluding involuntary statements. Id. Also, the court stated that holding police liable
for a defendant's conviction as a result of the admission of an involuntary statement ignores
the fact that the court may have convicted the defendant even without the prosecution's
introduction of the statement at trial. Id. at 943. The proper remedy for the court's improper
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dressed under this potential section 1983 claim is the actual coercion or the
prosecution's use of coerced statements at trial. 74
The third potential claim under section 1983 also arises under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 75 Police behavior that shocks
the conscience violates substantive due process and is actionable under
section 1983.76 This cause of action is not specific to the interrogational
context.7 7 Traditionally, this due process theory has been a safety net
ensuring that all government behavior, whatever the context, conforms to
minimum societal standards. 78 However, the standard is vague, and courts'
determinations of what behavior actually shocks the conscience vary greatly.
79
Recently, the Supreme Court has questioned the availability of this cause
of action in certain contexts, s0 but a shock-the-conscience claim remains an
option in the context of interrogations."s
admission of an involuntary statement at trial is to attack the conviction on appeal or through
a habeas corpus petition. See Bennett v. Passic, 545 F.2d 1260, 1263 (10th Cir. 1976) (stating
that plaintiff should challenge trial court's improper admission of statement through habeas
corpus petition, not civil rights action); Allen v. Eicher, 295 F. Supp. 1184, 1186 (D. Md.
1969) (holding that § 1983 plaintiff wishing to challenge his conviction because of Miranda
violation must do so through state appeals process, and then federal habeas corpus petition).
74. Compare Duncan, 466 F.2d at 945 (allowing § 1983 plaintiff to sue for damages
caused by unlawful interrogation) with Jackson, 518 F. Supp. at 621 (dismissing § 1983 claim
because court excluded involuntary statement from plaintiff's criminal trial).
75. See supra note 20 (quoting language of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause).
76. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952) (holding that police behavior
that shocks conscience violates principles of due process); infra note 209 (discussing holding
of Rochin).
77. See, e.g., Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 588 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding § 1983
cause of action because police behavior shocked conscience when they arrested driver of car
and left passenger alone in dangerous neighborhood where she subsequently was raped), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 341 (1990); Rutherford v. City of Berkeley, 780 F.2d 1444, 1447-48 (9th
Cir. 1986) (allowing § 1983 claim to proceed under shock-the-conscience theory when police
allegedly detained and beat suspect); Rosalie Berger Levinson, Protection Against Government
Abuse of Power: Has the Court Taken the Substance Out of Substantive Due Process, 16 U.
DAYTON L. Rav. 313, 322 (1991) (noting that Supreme Court and lower courts have extended
Rochin standard to outrageous government conduct in general).
78. See Levinson, supra note 77, at 322 (noting that substantive due process protects
against governmental misconduct).
79. See Cooper v. Dupnik, 924 F.2d 1520, 1530 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that standard
for determining when police violate substantive due process provides courts with little guidance),
rev'd, 963 F.2d 1220 (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 407 (1992). Compare Cooper v.
Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (finding § 1983 cause of action under substantive
due process when police deliberately ignored suspect's request for counsel and badgered suspect
during four hours of interrogation in hopes of keeping suspect from testifying in criminal trial
and depriving suspect of insanity defense), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 407 (1992) with Wilcox v.
Ford, 813 F.2d 1140, 1146-48 (1 1th Cir.) (finding that police behavior did not violate substantive
due process when, during interrogation of witnesses, police threatened to charge one with
murder, interrogated another for eight hours without providing food or water, threatened to
send him to electric chair and told him he would die in prison), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 925
(1987).
80. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393 (1989) (disallowing § 1983 plaintiff from
using shock-the-conscience claim for police use of excessive force during arrest); Whitley v.
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When analyzing section 1983 cases, courts often confuse Fifth Amend-
ment self-incrimination claims with claims of coercion under the Due Process
Clause, perhaps because of the way the two claims developed. s2 Before the
United States Supreme Court's holding in Miranda, the Due Process Clause
was the only available constitutional ground for excluding statements police
obtained during improper interrogations. 83 The Court intended the Miranda
decision to replace the unwieldy case-by-case due process analysis.14 How-
ever, the due process test has survived Miranda, and the confusion between
the two claims exists in part because the Court never has clarified fully this
interrelationship. 85 The Court determined under Miranda that the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination protects defendants only
from the prosecution's use of the defendant's presumably coerced statements
at trial.86 However, the Court has not defined clearly what harm the due
process cause of action for coercion targets.17 While the distinction between
the Fifth Amendment claim and the due process claim for coercion normally
has little practical importance, Cooper illustrates that the distinction can be
very important in certain contexts. 8 When the police improperly obtain a
statement that the prosecution never uses at trial, the harm, if any, that
occurs during the elicitation of the statement becomes very important in
determining the viability of a section 1983 claim.89
Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986) (rejecting shock-the-conscience standard for § 1983 claims of
police use of excessive force in postconviction context, in favor of Eighth Amendment cruel
and unusual punishment analysis).
81. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10 (specifically leaving open question of whether
shock-the-conscience cause of action is available for pretrial detainees); Cooper, 963 F.2d at
1244 n. I1 (noting that shock-the-conscience standard is still viable § 1983 claim when analyzing
statements police obtain from suspect).
82. See supra note 20 (discussing background of constitutional provisions governing
interrogations).
83. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1966) (replacing case-by-case due process
inquiry with bright line presumption of coercion absent procedural safeguards); Duncan v.
Nelson, 466 F.2d 939, 944 (7th Cir.) (noting that because interrogation at issue occurred before
Miranda, plaintiff's only available § 1983 claim was under Due Process Clause of Fourteenth
Amendment), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 894 (1972).
84. See Herman, supra note 5, at 733 (implying that Miranda Court intended to replace
involuntary confession rule with presumption of compulsion during interrogations).
85. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 397-98 (1978) (finding police obtained statement
in violation of Miranda and Due Process Clause by interrogating seriously wounded suspect
in hospital bed when suspect repeatedly requested counsel).
86. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984) (noting that Miranda warnings
are only procedural safeguards meant to protect against use of presumably coerced statements
at trial).
87. Compare Mincey, 437 U.S. at 402 (holding that due process requires courts to exclude
involuntary statements from trial) with Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 519 (1963)
(suggesting that involuntary statements violate due process because of police misconduct
involved in obtaining them).
88. See Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1257-58 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (Leavy, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that no § 1983 claim exists if prosecution never uses allegedly coerced
statement), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 407 (1992).
89. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 919 F.2d 1230, 1244 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that § 1983
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The due process claim for coercion and the due process shock-the-
conscience theory also overlap significantly in the section 1983 context. °
Courts sometimes employ vague language when analyzing section 1983 claims
for unconstitutional interrogations, and courts rarely indicate the specific
basis for finding a cause of action. 91 This failure to clarify the distinction
between these two potential section 1983 claims results ,in part because
coercive behavior that results in an involuntary statement is often also
behavior that shocks the conscience.92 When the police misconduct is ex-
treme, the distinction between the two claims is of little significance. 93
However, when the police misconduct is not so offensive, as to shock the
conscience, but is still coercive enough to result in an involuntary confession,
the distinction between the two due process claims under section 1983, and
what harm each addresses, is important. 94
During interrogation, varying levels of police misconduct may occur.
The interrogating officers merely may fail to inform suspects of their
Miranda rights, or they may fail to respect the suspects' invocation of those
rights. 95 Even if the police follow and respect Miranda's procedural safe-
liability is appropriate if police coerce statement with behavior that is unlawful in itself), rev'd
in part, 113 S. Ct. 2606 (1993); Duncan v. Nelson, 466 F.2d 939, 944 (7th Cir.) (restricting
§ 1983 plaintiff's possible damages to damages for harm suffered during interrogation), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 894 (1972); Coyne v. Boeckmann, 511 F. Supp. 667, 669-70 (E.D. Wis. 1981)
(allowing plaintiff opportunity to present proof of harm suffered as result of unlawful
interrogation).
90. See Duncan, 466 F.2d at 944 (allowing § 1983 claim for police coercion of involuntary
statement, but using language that is more in line with shock-the-conscience standard).
91. See Grant v. Foye, Nos. 91-55198, 91-55202, 1992 WL 371312, at *2 (9th Cir. Dec.
16, 1992) (finding § 1983 cause of action for wanton infliction of psychological torture but
not specifying constitutional ground); Gray v. Spillman, 925 F.2d 90, 94 (4th Cir. 1991)
(allowing, on unspecified constitutional ground, § 1983 cause of action because police allegedly
beat and intimidated suspect); Steward v. Summerville, No. 90-C-6956, 1992 WL 300986, at
*4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 1992) (recognizing § 1983 plaintiff's potential claim under unspecified
due process theory).
92. See Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1237 (finding § 1983 cause of action because police behavior
was coercive and because it shocked conscience).
93. See Lewis v. Brautigam, 227 F.2d 124, 128 (5th Cir. 1955) (allowing § 1983 claim
to proceed, on unspecified ground, because police secretly moved suspect to new prison to
prevent suspect from conferring with counsel, and police forced suspect to pose for photographs
dressed in prison garb); Steward, 1992 WL 300986 at *4 (finding § 1983 cause of action
because police allegedly beat suspect to obtain confession).
94. Compare Chrisco v. Shafran, 507 F. Supp. 1312, 1318 (D. Del. 1981) (recognizing
potential § 1983 cause of action for pain and suffering caused by unlawful police interrogation
of suspect who never was brought to trial) with Ransom v. City of Phila., 311 F. Supp. 973,
974 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (dismissing § 1983 claim of coercion because suspect's criminal trial was
still pending).
95. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 396 (1978) (describing interrogation in which
police questioned suspect in his hospital bed for four hours despite suspect's repeated requests
for counsel); Warren v. City of Lincoln, 864 F.2d 1436, 1438 (8th Cir.) (involving interrogation
in which police failed to read suspect his Miranda rights and ignored suspect's request for
counsel), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1091 (1989); Haupt v. Dillard, 794 F. Supp. 1480, 1489 (D.
Nev. 1992) (dealing with police failure to respect suspect's request for counsel during inter-
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guards and they obtain a valid waiver from the suspect, the police behavior
may be so coercive that the suspect's free will is overborne and courts will
deem any resulting statements involuntary. 96 The type of behavior that
courts may find coercive includes psychological badgering; threats; promises;
deprivation of food, sleep, or both; and physical violence. 97 The form of
police misconduct occurring during the interrogation is decisive in deter-
mining the viability of a section 1983 cause of action.98
A. Miranda Violations
1. Failure to Give Miranda Warnings
Courts, including the Cooper court, are unanimous in holding that
police failure to inform a suspect of the required Miranda warnings, without
rogation); Chrisco, 507 F. Supp. at 1317 (involving § 1983 plaintiff who alleged police
interrogated him without giving Miranda warnings and without honoring his request for
counsel).
96. See Mincey, 437 U.S. at 401-02 (determining that statements police obtained from
suspect who was seriously wounded, in extreme pain, and barely conscious were involuntary);
Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514 (1963) (holding that statements police obtained after
16 hours of interrogation during which police told suspect he could not call his wife unless
he cooperated, were involuntary); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963) (finding
suspect's confession, given in response to police threats that suspect would lose her children
if she did not cooperate, to be involuntary); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 406 (1945)
(finding confession involuntary when police interrogated naked, isolated suspect and ignored
his request for attorney).
97. See, e.g., Griffin v. Strong, 983 F.2d 1540, 1541-42 (10th Cir. 1993) (finding police
threatening suspect with loss of his daughter if he did not cooperate to be coercive); Cooper
v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1223 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (determining that deliberately unlawful
four hour interrogation during which police badgered suspect and made remarks about suspect's
religious background was coercive), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 407 (1992); Gray v. Spillman, 925
F.2d 90, 91 (4th Cir. 1991) (reversing district court's grant of motion for summary judgment
for police in § 1983 suit involving interrogation during which police allegedly handcuffed
suspect to chair, beat him, kept him without food or water for several hours, did not allow
him to use restroom, made racist remarks, and threatened further beating if suspect did not
confess); Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 191-92 (7th Cir. 1989) (reversing district court's
dismissal of § 1983 suit involving police holding gun to head of suspect in attempt to elicit
confession), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1026 (1990); Rex v. Teeples, 753 F.2d 840, 842 (10th Cir.)
(noting that confession resulting from police taking advantage of suspect's confused mental
state and deceiving suspect into believing he was not target of criminal investigation was
coerced), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 967 (1985); Duncan v. Nelson, 466 F.2d 939, 941 (7th Cir.)
(discussing § 1983 claim involving coerced confession police obtained through ten hour inter-
rogation of suspect just released from solitary confinement), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 894 (1972);
Kerr v. City of Chicago, 424 F.2d 1134, 1137 (7th Cir.) (involving interrogation of 17 year-
old suspect to whom police promised food and water if he confessed), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
833 (1970).
98. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 919 F.2d 1230, 1244 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that § 1983
liability is available only when police behavior during interrogation is forbidden on grounds
other than Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination), rev'd in part, 113 S. Ct.
2606 (1993).
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more, will not result in section 1983 liability. 99 The Supreme Court has
stated that a defendant has no constitutional right to receive Miranda
warnings because the warnings are merely procedural safeguards designed
to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.'0 By
failing to give those warnings, the police do not deprive the suspect of a
constitutional right.'0' Because the purpose of the warnings is to dispel the
inherent compulsion in custodial interrogations, °2 failure to give the warn-
ings leads to a presumption that the police coerced the statements from the
suspect and that courts therefore must exclude the statements from trial. 0 3
Unless actual coercion due to extreme police behavior occurs, however, no
deprivation of a constitutional right exists and no section 1983 liability
exists either.104 The constitutional right under Miranda is not the right to
be free from coercion, but rather it is the right to have courts exclude from
trial any statements that the police obtain without the specified warnings1 01
Therefore, the exclusion from trial of such statements provides an adequate
remedy for failure to give Miranda warnings.?° If the suspect never goes
to trial, no remedy is available because the suspect has suffered no harm.1' 7
99. See, e.g., Davis v. City of Charleston, 827 F.2d 317, 322 (8th Cir. 1987) (deciding
that police failure to inform suspect of Miranda rights did not deprive suspect of constitutional
right); Bennett v. Passic, 545 F.2d 1260, 1263 (10th Cir. 1976) (holding that no rational
argument exists for allowing § 1983 claim for failure to inform suspect of Miranda rights);
Thornton v. Buchmann, 392 F.2d 870, 874 (7th Cir. 1968) (finding that police failure to
inform suspect of Miranda rights was not actionable under § 1983 because suspect never went
to trial).
100. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974) (recognizing distinction between
constitutional right against self-incrimination and mere procedural safeguards of Miranda);
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 490 (1966) (acknowledging that Constitution does not
require warnings, or any specific procedure, to protect suspect's privilege against self-incrimi-
nation while police interrogate him).
101. See Buckley, 919 F.2d at 1244 (holding that suspects have no constitutional right to
Miranda warnings); Bennett, 545 F.2d at 1263 (dismissing § 1983 suit for police failure to read
suspect Miranda warnings because no constitutional right to such warnings exists).
102. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 (requiring that police read warnings to suspects before
interrogation in order to dispel compulsion inherent in such situations).
103. See id. at 479 (holding that courts may not admit at trial any statements police
obtain without giving Miranda warnings).
104. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307 (1985) (stating that Miranda exclusionary
rule sweeps more broadly than Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause and courts may
exclude statements in absence of actual coercion).
105. See Bennett v. Passic, 545 F.2d 1260, 1263 (10th Cir. 1976) (holding that Constitution
does not give suspect right to Miranda warnings, only right to be free from self-incrimination).
106. See Warren v. City of Lincoln, 864 F.2d 1436, 1442 (8th Cir.) (holding that exclusion
from trial is sole remedy for statements police obtained in violation of Miranda), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1091 (1989); Allen v. Eicher, 295 F. Supp. 1184, 1186 (D. Md. 1969) (holding
Miranda violations are significant only if prosecution attempts to use statements police obtained
from violation at trial); Ambrek v. Clark, 287 F. Supp. 208, 210 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (stating that
sole import of failure to warn suspect of Miranda warnings is court's exclusion from trial of
any statements police obtained).
107. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 919 F.2d 1230, 1244 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that
interrogations without Miranda safeguards do not violate suspect's constitutional rights unless
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2. Failure to Respect Miranda Rights
The Cooper court found that Cooper could sue under section 1983 'for
violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination because
the police refused his request for counsel during a custodial interrogation.0 8
The Cooper court reasoned that under Miranda a request for counsel is an
invocation of the constitutional right to remain silent.1°9 Rather than merely
violating Miranda's procedural safeguards, which is not by itself a consti-
tutional violation,"0 the task force violated Cooper's substantive Fifth
Amendment rights as delineated in Miranda."' The Cooper court limited
its holding by noting that a section 1983 cause of action does not exist
when police continue to talk in a benign way to suspects who have invoked
their Miranda rights, but only when the police use offensive tactics." 2
Before the Cooper decision, courts agreed that failure to respect the
defendant's invocation of Miranda rights, standing alone, would not give
rise to civil liability."' Courts saw the Miranda rights, like the Miranda
warnings, as only procedural safeguards designed to protect the constitu-
prosecution uses statements obtained at trial), rev'd in part, 113 S. Ct. 2606 (1993); Thornton
v. Buchmann, 392 F.2d 870, 874 (7th Cir. 1968) (holding that failure of police to give suspect
Miranda warnings has no significance when suspect never goes to trial); Turner v. Lynch, 534
F. Supp. 686, 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that court's exclusion of statements that police
obtain from suspect in violation of Miranda is sole remedy for wrong suspect suffers).
108. Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1242 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 407 (1992).
109. Id. at 1240.
110. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305 (1985) (noting that failure of police to give
suspect Miranda warnings is not constitutional violation, such that mere initial failure of police
to give warnings does not taint later statements police obtain after police give suspect full
Miranda warnings); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-56 (1984) (allowing public safety
exception to Miranda exclusionary rule, so long as police do not actually coerce statement
from suspect, because without actual coercion, no constitutional mandate to exclude evidence
exists).
111. See Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1242 (finding § 1983 cause of action because interrogators
ignored suspect's invocation of Miranda rights).
112. Id. at 1244. The Cooper court did not specify what offensive tactics would rise to
the level of a Fifth Amendment violation, nor did it articulate how this Fifth Amendment
cause of action differs from a section 1983 cause of action for coercion under Due Process
Clause. Id.
113. See Warren v. City of Lincoln, 864 F.2d 1436, 1442 (8th Cir.) (holding that failure
to respect suspect's request for counsel was merely procedural violation and not actionable
under § 1983, because Sixth Amendment right to counsel had yet to attach, and right to
counsel under Miranda is not constitutional right), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1091 (1989); Haupt
v. Dillard, 794 F. Supp. 1480, 1489 (D. Nev. 1992) (holding that police failure to honor
request for counsel is not actionable under § 1983 unless accompanied by police coercion or
improper treatment of suspect); Jackson v. Dillon, 518 F. Supp. 618, 621 (E.D.N.Y. 1981)
(stating that failure of police to honor suspect's request for counsel is not constitutional
violation unless prosecution uses statements obtained at trial); Chrisco v. Shafran, 507 F.
Supp. 1312, 1317, 1320-21 (D. Del. 1981) (deciding that police officer's failure to honor request
for counsel under Miranda does not create § 1983 cause of action).
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tional privilege against self-incrimination.1 4 In Chrisco v. Shafran,i 15 the
United States District Court for the District of Delaware heard a plaintiff's
section 1983 claim that his questioning officers actively prevented him from
having counsel present during a custodial interrogation." 6 The Chrisco court
dismissed the cause of action for failure to state a claim for relief." 7 The
district court noted that the Miranda right to counsel :is fundamentally
different from the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel." 8 The
Miranda right to counsel is a procedural safeguard designed to protect the
Fifth Amendment privilege. 119 The Chrisco court noted that in order to
remedy a Sixth Amendment violation, courts exclude from trial statements
that the police elicit from a suspect in violation of the suspect's right to
assistance of counsel.1 ° On the other hand, in the Fifth Amendment context,
the defendant's right to the exclusion of statements obtained in violation
of Miranda's right to counsel is itself the constitutional right.' 2' The Chrisco
court concluded that when police simply ignore the invocation of Miranda
114. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. %436, 469 (1966) (stating that right to counsel
during custodial interrogation is indispensable to protection of Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination); Warren, 864 F.2d at 1442 (holding that right to counsel under
Miranda is merely procedural safeguard protecting Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination); Chrisco, 507 F. Supp. at 1320 (drawing distinction between procedural right
to counsel under Miranda and constitutional right to counsel under Sixth Amendment).
115. 507 F. Supp. 1312 (D. Del. 1981).
116. Chrisco v. Shafran, 507 F. Supp. 1312, 1320 (D. Del. 1981). In Chrisco the United
States District Court for the District of Delaware considered Chrisco's claim that two police
officers were liable under § 1983 for violation of Chrisco's Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. Id. at 1316. The police officers interviewed Chrisco during a custodial
interrogation. Id. at 1317. Chrisco alleged that the police did not give him his Miranda
warnings and did not allow him to have an attorney present during the interrogation. Id. The
Chrisco court first noted that the failure of police officers to deliver Miranda warnings is not
actionable under section 1983. Id. However, Chrisco also claimed that the police violated his
right to counsel when the police excluded Chrisco's attorney from the interrogation. Id. at
1320. The Chrisco court responded that the right to have an attorney present during a custodial
interrogation is a procedural safeguard, not a constitutional right, therefore the § 1983 claim
failed. Id.
117. See id. at 1321 (finding no § 1983 cause of action for police failure to give suspect
Miranda warnings or to honor suspect's request for counsel).
118. Id. at 1320; see supra note 20 (quoting language of Sixth Amendment). The Sixth
Amendment right to the assistance of counsel does not attach until the government begins
formal judicial proceedings against the suspect. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205
(1964); see supra note 20 (discussing holding of Massiah). If police fail to honor a request for
counsel after the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel has attached, the suspect
will have a claim under § 1983 even if the government never brings the! suspect to trial. See
Cooper v. Dupnik, 924 F.2d 1520, 1528 n.12 (9th Cir. 1991) (dictum) (noting that government
violates Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel as soon as it denies suspect access to
attorney), rev'd, 963 F.2d 1220 (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 407 (1992).
119. Chrisco, 507 F. Supp. at 1320-21; see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966)
(holding that right to counsel during custodial interrogation is necessary to protect Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination).
120. Chrisco, 507 F. Supp. at 1321.
121. Id.; see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 439 (stating that holding of court deals with admissibility
at trial of statements obtained by police during custodial interrogation).
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rights, no constitutional violation exists and therefore no civil liability
arises.'22
The language in the Cooper court's opinion suggesting that the Miranda
right to counsel is more than a procedural safeguard protecting the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination departs from prior courts'
analyses of the issue.'2 The Cooper court argued that a request for counsel
is an invocation of the substantive Fifth Amendment privilege.
24 Implicit
in this statement is the notion that if the police ignore a request for counsel
under Miranda, they are infringing on the suspect's right against compulsory
self-incrimination. 125 This argument supports the idea that a constitutional
violation occurs as soon as the police deny suspects their Miranda right to
counsel.' 26 Therefore courts can hold police civilly liable whether or not the
court rules statements police obtain in this manner admissible at trial.
27
The Cooper court, however, limited its holding by stating that "[t]his
case does not establish a cause of action where police officers continue to
talk to a suspect after he asserts his rights and where they do so in a benign
way, without coercion or tactics that compel him to speak."'n Even with
such a limitation on the majority's holding, there was a strong dissent.
29
The dissenting judges in Cooper stressed that because Cooper never went
to trial, no Fifth Amendment violation occurred. 30 Further, the dissent
recognized the inherent contradiction in the court's holding that only of-
122. Chrisco v. Shafran, 507 F. Supp. 1312, 1321 (D. Del. 1981). But see Miranda, 384
U.S. at 460 (stating that police satisfy Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
only when they guarantee suspects right to remain silent unless suspects choose to speak of
their own free will).
123. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469 (stating that right to counsel in custodial interrogations
is procedural safeguard meant to protect Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination);
Johnson v. Carroll, 694 F. Supp. 500, 504 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (noting that Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination has no relevance until suspect testifies at his criminal trial);
Jackson v. Dillon, 518 F. Supp. 618, 621 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that until court introduces
unlawfully obtained statements at trial, the suspect's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination has not been violated).
124. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473 (1966) (holding that invocation of right
to counsel during custodial interrogation indicates that suspect intends to exercise his Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination); Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1240 (9th
Cir.) (en banc) (holding that suspect's request for counsel is invocation of Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 407 (1992).
125. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460 (noting that rationale behind Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination is protection of suspect's dignity and free will and that privilege is
fulfilled only when suspect is guaranteed right to remain silent).
126. Id. at 461.
127. See id. at 460 (holding that Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is
fulfilled only when suspect is free not to speak).
128. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1243-44. But see id. at 1255 (Brunetti, J., dissenting) (arguing
that purported limitation on court's holding is illusory because court's main point is that it is
police failure to honor request for counsel that leads to coercion).
129. See id. at 1256 (Brunetti, J., dissenting) (arguing majority departed from § 1983
precedent because of offensive police misconduct).
130. Id. at 1253-54.
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fensive, but not benign, questioning following an invocation of the right to
remain silent is actionable under section 1983.'
3 1
The limitation is problematic because if, as the majority reasoned, a
suspect's request for counsel is an invocation of a constitutional right, then
no reason exists for courts to consider what type of police behavior follows
such an invocation.52 If the coercive police behavior following suspects'
invocation of their Miranda rights is at issue, then courts traditionally
address that coercion under a due process analysis.' If the Cooper court
truly was concerned that a suspect's invocation of Miranda rights be
respected, the limitation regarding benign questioning following such an
invocation undermines the holding. Because courts probably will not find
benign questioning following such an invocation to be coercive, 13 4 they
probably will allow the prosecution to use any statements the police obtain
in this manner for impeachment. a5 The Cooper court's holding merely
reinforces police incentive to ignore suspects' invocation of their Miranda
rights, provided they do so without coercion.' 36
Like police failure to give Miranda warnings, their failure to respect
Miranda rights, provided that no coercive behavior follows, results only in
the courts' preventing the prosecution from using at trial any statements
the police obtained after the suspects invoked any of their Miranda rights. 3
7
However, the prosecution may be able to use any voluntary statements,
even if the police obtained them in violation of Miranda, to impeach the
suspect's credibility if the suspect chooses to testify. 13s As the facts of
Cooper illustrate, without section 1983 liability the police have a strong
incentive to take advantage of this impeachment exception. 19 Once suspects
131. Id. at 1255 (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
132. See id. at 1257 (Leavy, J., dissenting) (questioning why, if request for counsel is
invocation of Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, privilege is lost without
waiver if police later elicit statements in benign way).
133. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978) (analyzing police methods of
obtaining statement under Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment).
134. See Warren v. City of Lincoln, 864 F.2d 1436, 1442 (8th Cir.) (finding that police
officer's failure to read suspect his Miranda rights or to honor his request for counsel, without
more, is not constitutional violation), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1091 (1989).
135. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971) (holding that courts may admit
at trial trustworthy statements that police obtain in violation of Miranda).
136. See Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1257 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (Leavy, J., dissenting)
(questioning why suspect's invocation of Fifth Amendment privilege by requesting counsel is
lost without waiver when police continue to question benignly), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 407
(1992).
137. See Haupt v. Dillard, 794 F. Supp. 1480, 1489 (D. Nev. 1992) (holding that, in light
of Cooper decision, § 1983 claim does not exist for mere police failure to honor suspect's
request for counsel).
138. See Harris, 401 U.S. at 226 (holding that prosecution may admit at trial voluntary
statements police obtain in violation of Miranda to impeach suspect's credibility and prevent
perjury).
139. See Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1225 (describing deliberate unlawful police plan to violate
suspect's Miranda rights in hopes of obtaining voluntary statement which would keep suspect
from testifying on his own behalf and deprive suspect of insanity defense).
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invoke their Miranda rights, the police may have nothing to lose by
proceeding with questioning in a noncoercive manner in hopes of obtaining
d voluntary statement. 140
To the extent that Cooper suggests that mere police failure to respect
a suspect's Miranda rights results in civil liability, it may be because the
court's Fifth Amendment analysis is what most courts would consider a
due process analysis. 41 The Cooper court limits the Fifth Amendment cause
of action to situations involving coercive police behavior. 42 This limitation
suggests that the Cooper court was more concerned with the coercion than
the interrogator's failure to respect the suspect's request for counsel. 43
B. Due Process Claims
1. Coerced Statements
Courts typically analyze claims of coercion under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'" The analysis focuses on whether
the police overcame the suspect's will, looking at the totality of the circum-
stances. 145 If the police use physical violence against the suspect, courts
almost always will find that any resulting statements were involuntary.'"
140. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 232 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing
that impeachment exception encourages police to violate law in order to successfully prosecute
suspect); Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1226 (involving unlawful interrogation plan devised because
police lacked other extrinsic evidence linking suspect to crime).
141. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978) (analyzing trial court's admission
of allegedly involuntary statement under Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment).
142. See Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1244 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (holding that police
failure to honor suspect's request for counsel results in § 1983 claim only when followed by
coercive police behavior),'cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 407 (1992).
143. Id.; Haupt v. Dillard, 794 F. Supp. 1480, 1489 (D. Nev. 1992) (declining, in light
of Cooper decision, to allow § 1983 claim for mere police failure to respect suspect's request
for counsel).
144. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163 (1986) (noting that Supreme Court has
continued to apply due process analysis to allegedly coerced confession despite application of
Fifth Amendment to states); Mincey, 437 U.S. at 398 (determining that police questioning of
seriously wounded suspect in his hospital bed violated Due Process Clause); Haynes v.
Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514 (1963) (holding that police violated Due Process Clause by
obtaining confession that was not product of suspect's free will); Spano v. New York,. 360
U.S. 315, 320 (1959) (finding that police violated Due Process Clause by extracting involuntary
confession from suspect); Cooper v. Dupnik, 924 F.2d 1520, 1529 n.17 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting
that courts analyze allegedly coerced confessions under Due Process Clause of Fourteenth
Amendment rather than under Self-Incrimination Clause of Fifth Amendment due to historical
accident), rev'd, 963 F.2d 1220 (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 407 (1992); Rex v. Teeples,
753 F.2d 840, 843 (10th Cir.) (holding that police coercion of confession from suspect was
due process violation), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 967 (1985).
145. See Mincey, 437 U.S. at 398, 401 (evaluating, under all circumstances of interrogation,
whether suspect's statements were product of rational intellect and free will).
146. Gray v. Spillman, 925 F.2d 90, 93 (4th Cir. 1991) (noting courts have long recognized
that police beating of suspect during interrogation violates Fourteenth Amendment).
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However, psychological tactics also may lead to coercion. 47 Mere threats
of physical violence may result in an involuntary statement, as can promises
police make to the suspect in return for a confession.48 Other factors courts
look to are the age, education, and experience of the suspect; the length of
the interrogation; and the atmosphere in which it takes place. 149 Overall,
the inquiry focuses on the suspect's state of mind and whether under all
the circumstances the suspect made the statements freely.5 0
In cases that involve coercion, courts do not agree whether a section
1983 cause of action is available."' Coercing an involuntary statement from
a suspect is a constitutional violation, but unlike Miranda violations, courts
have not clarified whether the violation occurs when the police coerce the
statements from the suspect or when the prosecution introduces the coerced
statements at trial.5 2 If only prosecutorial use of the statement at trial
violates the Constitution, then like Miranda violations, no civil liability for
the interrogating officers exists.15  However, if the action of coercion itself
147. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 401 (1978) (noting that gross police abuse is
not necessary to find statement involuntary); Haynes, 373 U.S. at 504 (holding that confession
police obtained by promising suspect he could call his wife if he cooperated was involuntary);
Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963) (finding involuntary statement that police obtained
by threatening suspect with loss of her children); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 405-
06 (1945) (determining that suspect's confession was involuntary because police ignored suspect's
request for counsel and questioned suspect while he was naked and isolated).
148. See Haynes, 373 U.S. at 504 (finding confession involuntary because police obtained
it by promising suspect he could call his wife if he confessed).
149. See Mincey, 437 U.S. at 401-02 (holding that statement police obtained from suspect
isolated from family, friends, and counsel, weakened by serious wound, and barely conscious
was involuntary); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514 (1963) (focusing on suspect's
isolation during 16 hour interrogation during which police coerced involuntary statement
through threats and promises); Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534 (noting, in analyzing allegedly
involuntary confession, that suspect was surrounded by three police officers, had no friends
or counsel present, had no experience with criminal law, and had no reason not to believe
police could carry out threats regarding loss of her children); Malinski, 324 U.S. at 405
(finding confession involuntary because suspect was naked, alone, and without counsel while
police interrogated him).
150. See Mincey, 437 U.S. at 399 (focusing on suspect's desire not to talk to police to
find suspect's statement involuntary); Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534 (stating that test of voluntary
confession is whether suspects confessed of their own free will).
151. See Mahoney v. Kesery, 976 F.2d 1054, 1061-62 (7th Cir. 1992) (acknowledging two
different interpretations of § 1983 liability for coerced confessions - that it forbids only use
of coerced statements at trial, and that it forbids coercion itself).
152. Compare Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 919 F.2d 1230, 1244 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that
no § 1983 liability exists when police merely compel suspect to speak), rev'd in part, 113 S.
Ct. 2606 (1993) with Duncan v. Nelson, 466 F.2d 939, 945 (7th Cir.) (recognizing § 1983 claim
for harm suffered from police coercion during interrogation), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 894
(1972).
153. See Duncan, 466 F.2d at 942 (holding that courts cannot hold police officers liable
under § 1983 for trial court's act of improperly admitting confession); Loewy, supra note 33,
at 908 (arguing that police should be civilly liable for obtaining evidence in unconstitutional
manner, but not for obtaining evidence that courts unconstitutionally admit at trial); supra




violates the Constitution, then police officers should be subject to a section
1983 suit regardless of whether any coerced statements are used at trial .
5 4
In Cooper the Ninth Circuit held that a section 1983 action is available
even if the prosecution does not use the coerced statements at trial.'55 The
court found that the coercive interrogational methods themselves are the
affront to the Constitution. 56 When courts exclude coerced statements from
trial, they are merely "applying the corrective where due process already
has been denied.' 57 The fact that the prosecution does not use the state-
ments at trial is relevant only to damages, not to whether a section 1983
cause of action is available. 5
Whether courts determine that the constitutional violation occurs when
the police obtain the statement during interrogation or when the prosecution
uses it at trial depends on the court's underlying rationale for finding
coercion unconstitutional. 59 Courts base the due process claim of coercion
loosely on the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination,16 but
whether courts limit the remedy for coercion to exclusion of the statements
from trial is less clear.' 6' Case law exists supporting the argument that, like
claims under the Fifth Amendment, the court must mistakenly allow the
prosecution to introduce the coerced statement at trial before a constitutional
154. See Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1245 (9th Cir.) (en bane) (holding that
prosecution's failure to use coerced statements at trial is not relevant to whether § 1983 cause
of action is available), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 407 (1992); Duncan, 466 F.2d at 943 (holding
that suspect may sue under § 1983 for mental anguish, pain, and injury suffered due to
coercive interrogation); Loewy, supra note 33, at 934 (arguing that suspects who police subject
to extreme stress during interrogation may sue police for violation of their constitutional
rights).
155. See Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1237 (allowing § 1983 suit for police coercion during
interrogation to proceed to trial even though prosecution never used coerced statement at
trial).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1245.
158. See id. (stating that prosecution's failure to bring defendant to trial or use his
coerced statements at trial is relevant only to determining damages).
159. Compare Duncan v. Nelson, 466 F.2d 939, 944 (7th Cir.) (holding that courts may
base Due Process Clause prohibition against coerced confessions in Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, but essence of claim of due process violation is that police conduct
offends decency and fairness), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 894 (1972) with Hampton v. Gilmore,
60 F.R.D. 71, 81 (E.D. Mo.) (holding that becausi suspect has no constitutional right not to
be interrogated while incarcerated on criminal charges, § 1983 suit is not available unless court
admits coerced statement at trial), aff'd, 486 F.2d 1407 (8th Cir. 1973).
160. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964) (noting, in pre-Miranda decision, that
courts analyze violations of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause prohibition against
coerced confessions under same standard as that imposed by Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination); Duncan, 466 F.2d at 944 (holding that courts base due process prohibition
against coercion during interrogation on Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination).
161. See Duncan, 466 F.2d at 944 (noting that suspect's due process right to be free from
coercion may be rooted in Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, but essence
of claim is that police behavior offends societal standards).
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violation occurs. 162 Support also exists for the argument that the actual
coercion during interrogation violates the Constitution. 63 Therefore, an
exclusion from trial is merely one remedy for that violation, and a section
1983 claim is another.'6
The United States Supreme Court departed from the various rationales
previously used by courts for excluding coerced confessions in Malloy v.
Hogan. 65 In Malloy, the Supreme Court stated that courts must exclude
coerced confessions from trial because these confessions violate the privilege
against self-incrimination.16 From this reasoning, the primary constitutional
violation that arises from coerced confessions is the prosecution's use of
162. See Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 195 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that federal courts
should not monitor particulars of police interrogation or award § 1983 damages if police
behavior is merely coercive), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1026 (1990); Govan v. Chicago Police
Dep't, No. 90-C-3471, 1991 WL 38695, at *2 (N.D. I11. Mar. 18, 1991) (holding that police's
verbal threatening of suspect during interrogation is not constitutional violation until courts
make use of statements police obtain in this manner at trial); Jackson v. Dillon, 518 F. Supp.
618, 621 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (declaring that no constitutional violation exists when police merely
obtain involuntary statement from suspect); Ransom v. City of Phila., 311 F. Supp. 973, 974
(E.D. Pa. 1970) (holding that no constitutional violation exists for police coercion during
interrogation unless prosecution makes use of illegally obtained statement).
163. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320 (1959) (stating that society abhors
involuntary confessions because of notion that police must obey law while enforcing law);
Cooper v. Dupnik, 924 F.2d 1520, 1529 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that actual police coercion
during interrogation is due process violation provided police overcome the suspect's will),
rev'd, 963 F.2d 1220 (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 407 (1992); Kerr v. City of Chicago,
424 F.2d 1134, 1138 (7th Cir.) (finding police coercion of confession actionable under § 1983),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 833 (1970); Coyne v. Boeckmann, 511 F. Supp. 667, 669-70 (E.D. Wis.
1981) (allowing § 1983 plaintiff to present evidence of damages sustained as result of police
coercion during interrogation).
164. See Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1245 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (noting that
constitutional violation from coerced confessions is complete with police coercion and that
court must apply corrective during trial or through § 1983 liability), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
407 (1992).
165. 378 U.S. 1 (1964); see Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971) (holding that
courts may not introduce involuntary statements at trial for any purpose because they are
untrustworthy); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514 (1963) (finding confession involuntary
because police overbore defendant's will); Spano, 360 U.S. at 320 (noting that courts disapprove
of involuntary confessions because they are untrustworthy and because police methods must
conform to legal standards).
166. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment,
like Fifth Amendment, secures privilege against compelled self-incrimination); Loewy, supra
note 33, at 933 (arguing that Malloy established that coerced confessions violate Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination).
In Malloy, the Supreme Court considered whether the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Malloy, 378 U.S.
at 2. The state court in Malloy imprisoned the defendant for contempt of court because he
refused to answer questions on the ground that he would incriminate himself. Id. at 3. Noting
that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from admitting statements at trial which the
police coerced from suspects, the Malloy Court reasoned that the Fourteenth Amendment must
also prohibit states from compelling suspects to incriminate themselves through the threat of
imprisonment. Id. at 8. Therefore, the Malloy Court found that the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination applied to the states. Id.
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them at trial. 67 Courts' exclusion of the confessions should be the only
remedy. 6s Although the Supreme Court never has addressed the issue of
section 1983 liability for coerced confessions directly, Justice Harlan, in his
concurrence in Monroe v. Pape,169 acknowledged the possibility that psy-
chological coercion during an interrogation could lead to section 1983
damages. 170 United States courts of appeals that have addressed the issue
have tended to agree with Justice Harlan.
7 '
In Duncan v. Nelson, 72 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit dealt with the issue of whether a plaintiff could sue under
section 1983 for damages arising from the police's coercing a confession
from him.73 The police picked up the plaintiff for interrogation just after
167. See Loewy, supra note 33, at 933 (arguing that after Malloy, primary constitutional
violation of coerced confession is prosecution's use of it at trial).
168. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 919 F.2d 1230, 1244 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that
suspect's privilege against self-incrimination is mere evidentiary privilege and violation can
occur only during trial), rev'd in part, 113 S. Ct. 2606 (1993).
169. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
170. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 n.5 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring) (offering
psychological coercion leading to confession as example of constitutional violation for which
§ 1983 remedy should be available), overruled in part by Monell v. Department of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). In Monroe the Supreme Court considered whether the phrase
"under color of" in § 1983 encompassed unconstitutional action taken without state authority
in addition to unconstitutional action taken under state authority. Id. at 184. The plaintiffs
in Monroe brought a claim under § 1983 against police officers for violation of their
constitutional rights. Id. at 169. The police officers broke into the family's home without a
search warrant, awoke and stripped them naked while they ransacked the house. Id. The police
took the father to the police station and interrogated him for 10 hours without taking him
before an available magistrate. Id. In addition, the police did not allow the father to contact
his family or an attorney. Id. The police later released the father without charging him with
a crime. Id. The Supreme Court determined that § 1983 was meant to supplement existing
state remedies and the existence of state remedies for the constitutional violations did not
preclude a § 1983 claim. Id. at 183. The Monroe Court further held that § 1983 provided a
remedy to people deprived of a constitutional right by a state official's abuse of his position,
regardless of whether the official had authority for his actions under state law. Id. at 184-87.
171. See Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1237 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (allowing § 1983
suit for coercion during custodial interrogation), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 407 (1992); Gray v.
Spillman, 925 F.2d 90, 94 (4th Cir. 1991) (allowing § 1983" suit for police extraction of
involuntary confession from suspect); Rex v. Teeples, 753 F.2d 840, 843 (10th Cir.) (holding
that plaintiff can sue police under § 1983 for extracting involuntary confession), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 967 (1985); Duncan v. Nelson, 466 F.2d 939, 943 (7th Cir.) (finding that § 1983
plaintiff can sue for mental anguish and pain suffered during interrogation), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 894 (1972).
172. 466 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1972).
173. Duncan v. Nelson, 466 F.2d 939, 940 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 894 (1972).
In Duncan the plaintiff sought damages for his conviction and nine year incarceration resulting
from the trial court's introduction of Duncan's involuntary statement. Id. The Duncan court
found that the plaintiff stated no claim for relief for damages arising from his conviction and
incarceration because the trial court's admission of the statement was an intervening act for
which the court could not hold the police responsible. Id. at 942. However, the court found
that Duncan did state a § 1983 cause of action for the alleged police coercion of involuntary
confession. Id. at 944. The Duncan court distinguished on two grounds cases holding that
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he was released from solitary confinement, where he had been held for
eighteen days on an unrelated offense. 174 The police handcuffed him to a
chair in the interrogation room and questioned him for ten hours until he
confessed.1 7s Duncan sued under section 1983 claiming the police coerced
his confession. 76 Although the prosecution used Duncan's confessions against
him at trial, the Duncan court held that Duncan could not! sue for damages
for his later incarceration. 7 7 However, the court found that Duncan could
sue for damages arising from the interrogation itself. 178 The court reasoned
that "[a]lthough the due process right allegedly violated here may be found
in the historical underpinnings of the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against
self-incrimination, the essence of the plaintiff's claim is that the police
conduct here alleged offends [the] ... requirements of decency and fair-
ness."1 7
9
Although Duncan supports civil liability for the actual coercion, tle
interrogation at issue in Duncan occurred before the Malloy or Miranda
decisions.18 0 Additionally, the Duncan court specifically noted that it based
the holding on the Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted before the Supreme
Court incorporated into it the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.' 8 ' Other courts, including the Cooper court, subsequently
followed Duncan's holding.
2 2
Courts that find a section 1983 cause of action for due process violations
seek to deter police coercion in custodial interrogations by imposing civil
Miranda violations do not lead to § 1983 violations. Id. First, the court noted that Miranda
violations constitute only an unrebuttable presumption in the criminal trial that the defendant's
constitutional rights were violated. Id. Second, the court reasoned that Miranda violations are
not constitutional violations until statements the police obtain in violation of Miranda are
introduced at trial. Id. The Duncan court construed the plaintiff's claim as one arising under
the Due Process Clause, and held that the plaintiff could sue under § 1983 for any harm
suffered during the interrogation. Id. at 945.
174. Id. at 941.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 942; see supra note 73 (noting Duncan court's holding that § 1983 plaintiffs
cannot sue police for damages arising from their conviction and incarceration).
178. Duncan v. Nelson, 466 F.2d 939, 943 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 894 (1972).
179. Id. at 944.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1237 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (finding that police
violated suspect's due process rights by coercing statements from him, whether or not
prosecution introduced statements at trial), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 407 (1992); Gray v.
Spillman, 925 F.2d 90, 94 (4th Cir. 1991) (allowing § 1983 suit for police extraction of
involuntary confession); Rex v. Teeples, 753 F.2d 840, 843 (10th Cir.) (holding that plaintiff
could sue police under § 1983 for their extraction of involuntary confession), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 967 (1985); Coyne v. Boeckmann, 511 F. Supp. 667, 669-70 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (allowing
§ 1983 plaintiff to sue for damages for harm suffered during unlawful police interrogation).
But see Ransom v. City of Phila., 311 F. Supp. 973, 974 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (disallowing § 1983




liability.' If the rationale behind finding a constitutional violation for
coerced statements is the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation, the question then becomes whether deterrence of improper police
behavior is a proper goal.'14 If the Fifth Amendment's only purpose is to
protect suspects from being compelled to be witnesses against themselves at
trial,' no Fifth Amendment violation can occur, regardless of the police
methods used, provided the court excludes the compelled statements.
18 6
However, under the Duncan court's rationale, a due process violation for
a coerced confession, while based in the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination, cuts more broadly by addressing the actual methods of
interrogation.8 7 Under the Duncan court's theory, police deterrence becomes
an aim encompassed within due process. 8
Whether courts view the due process claim of coercion as equivalent to
a claim under the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, or
whether they view it as a broader claim addressing police behavior during
interrogation, neither reading of the rationale behind the unconstitutionality
of coerced confessions is adequate.'89 Many cases involve police who simply
are overzealous.'90 They may obtain a coerced confession, but their methods
hardly could be said to be unconstitutional. 91 For instance, in Arizona v.
183. See Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1247 (stating the court's holding is sending message to
police that their behavior must conform to standards of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).
184. See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 519 (1963) (excluding involuntary statement
from trial because police methods used to obtain it were unlawful); Loewy, supra note 33, at
925 (arguing that court's attempt to deter police misconduct through exclusion of statements
police obtain in violation of Miranda is not legitimate).
185. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (declaring that suspects cannot be compelled to incriminate
themselves); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307 (1985) (holding that Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination protects suspects only from prosecution's use of compelled
statements at trial).
186. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 448 (1972) (holding that government
can compel testimony from suspect without violating suspect's Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination if government grants suspect immunity against prosecution's use of
that testimony against suspect in criminal trial); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 919 F.2d 1230, 1244
(7th Cir. 1990) (holding that Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is mere
evidentiary privilege), rev'd in part, 113 S. Ct. 2606 (1993).
187. See Duncan v. Nelson, 466 F.2d 939, 944 (7th Cir.) (holding that essence of due
process prohibition of coerced confessions is that police conduct must be decent and fair),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 894 (1972).
188. See Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1247 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (noting that court's
holding that plaintiff could sue police under § 1983 for coercing confession was sending
message to police department), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 407 (1992); Duncan, 466 F.2d at 944
(finding § 1983 cause of action because police elicited statement using offensive behavior).
189. See Loewy, supra note 33, at 934 (noting that not all police coercion is unconstitu-
tional).
190. See Loewy, supra note 33, at 934 (noting that police do not violate Constitution
merely by coercing confession from suspect).
191. See Jackson v. Dillon, 518 F. Supp. 618, 621 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (noting that suspect's
burden in proving that police obtained involuntary statement is not as high as suspect's burden
in § 1983 claim for police coercion); Loewy, supra note 33, at 917 (arguing that simply because
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Fulminante,92 a police informant coerced a statement from a suspect by
promising to protect the suspect from physical harm at the hands of fellow
prisoners. 93 The Court excluded the statement from trial because the in-
formant had coerced it. 194 Because making this promise to obtain a confes-
sion was not extreme, holding the informant civilly liable in such a situation
would be drastic. 95
Other coercive interrogations involve such extreme behavior that civil
liability is clearly an appropriate deterrent.' 96 For instance, in Brown v.
Mississippi'97 the police beat and tortured the defendants into confessing. 98
prosecution's use of statement at trial would violate suspect's Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, it does not follow that police behavior in ! obtaining statement
justifies civil liability).
192. 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991).
193. Arizona v. Fulminante, Ill S. Ct. 1246, 1252-53 (1991). In Fulminante the Court
analyzed whether a suspect's confession, which the prosecution used to convict the suspect of
his stepdaughter's murder, was voluntary. Id. at 1250. Fulminante was in prison on an
unrelated charge and befriended inmate Sarivola, a paid FBI informant. Id. Sarivola heard
rumors that Fulminante murdered his stepdaughter and the FBI instructed Sarivola to investigate
further. Id. Sarivola approached Fulminante and told him he knew that Fulminanfe was getting
rough treatment from fellow prisoners because he was a rumored child killer. Id. In response
to Sarivola's promise of protection, Fulminante confessed to the murder. Id.
The trial court admitted the confession and Fulminante was convicted of murder. Id. at
1251. The Arizona Supreme Court ruled that the police had coerced the confession and the
United States Supreme Court affirmed, overturning the conviction. Id. at 1252. Analyzing the
confession under the totality of the circumstances, the court found that the police overbore
Fulminante's will with a credible threat of physical violence and therefore the court erroneously
admitted the confession. Id. at 1253.
194. Id.
195. See Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 195 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that courts should
not award § 1983 damages every time police coerce confessions from suspects), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1026 (1990); Loewy, supra note 33, at 934 (arguing that courts should not hold
police personally liable when police misconduct is justifiable, or not unconstitutional in itself).
196. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 919 F.2d 1230, 1244 (7th Cir. 1991) (noting that § 1983
liability is appropriate only when police misconduct is complete with interrogation), rev'd in
part, 113 S. Ct. 2606 (1993); Loewy, supra note 33, at 934 (contending that police obtain
some involuntary confessions unconstitutionally).
197. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
198. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 281-82 (1936). In Brown the Supreme Court
considered whether the conviction of three defendants for murder based solely on confessions
the police obtained through physical violence was consistent with due process of law. Id. at
279. The police hanged one defendant from a tree twice, and then repeatedly whipped him
until he confessed to the murder. Id. at 281. The police brought the two other defendants to
the jail, stripped them naked and whipped them with a belt. Id. at 282. The police informed
the defendants that they would stop the whipping when the defendants confessed. Id. When
the defendants finally confessed, the whipping continued until the confessions conformed to
the details demanded by the police. Id.
The court convicted the defendants of murder; the confessions were the only significant
evidence the prosecution introduced against them at trial. Id. at 279. The Court noted that
the state was not bound by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, so it
analyzed the confessions under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at
285. The Court held that the police behavior was revolting to the sense of justice and use at
trial of confessions obtained in such a manner violated Due Process. Id. at 286. Accordingly,
the Court overturned the convictions. Id. at 287.
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The United States Supreme Court excluded the confessions from trial,'9
but one hardly could argue that this exclusion cured the harm done to the
defendants, or that courts should not deter such behavior. 200 Civil liability
also is appropriate in a case like Cooper, in which the police subject the
defendant to four hours of "hammering" by a interrogator as part of a
department-wide conspiracy.
20'
The problem with holding police personally liable for all coerced con-
fessions is that the inquiry for determining whether a confession was coerced
focuses on the suspect's state of mind. 20 2 An inquiry under section 1983,
however, should focus on the police behavior involved. 20 3 The burden of
proof on a plaintiff under the exclusionary rule, to prevent the court from
admitting an involuntary statement at trial, and the burden in a section
1983 case should not be the same. 204 The section 1983 inquiry should focus
on the police behavior and whether the behavior crossed the constitutional
line, regardless of whether the police conduct occurs during an interroga-
tion.2°s Such an inquiry is better addressed under the broader shock-the-
conscience standard. s
2. Police Behavior that Shocks the Conscience
Another potential ground exists for a section 1983 cause of action when
the methods the police use to obtain the confession are so offensive that
199. Id. at 286.
200. See Loewy, supra note 33, at 934 (arguing that courts should allow suspects to sue
police under § 1983 for behavior that is clearly wrong in itself).
201. See Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1250 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (allowing § 1983
suit to proceed when police behavior shocked conscience), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 407 (1992).
202. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1251 (1991) (finding confession invol-
untary because police informant obtained it by promising to protect defendant who feared for
his life); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 399 (1978) (focusing on suspect's helpless and
weakened condition to find his statement involuntary); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534
(1963) (focusing on suspect's belief that police could take her children away if she did not
cooperate to find her statement involuntary); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 407 (1945)
(finding confession involuntary because police obtained it through suspect's fear). But see
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164 (1986) (holding that coercive police conduct is
essential element of involuntary confession); Benner, supra note 33, at 127 (arguing that
Connelly Court repudiated concept of free will as element of voluntary confession by focusing
solely on police behavior).
203. See Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1251-52 (noting that task force's unconstitutional behavior
invited § 1983 suit).
204. See Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 195 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting that courts should
not award damages whenever police merely coerce suspects during interrogation), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1026 (1990); Jackson v. Dillon, 518 F. Supp. 618, 621 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (stating
suspect's burden for proving confession was involuntary and suspect's burden in § 1983 suit
are not equivalent).
205. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 919 F.2d 1230, 1244 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that no
§ 1983 cause of action exists for police coercion unless behavior involved is unconstitutional
on other grounds), rev'd in part, 112 S. Ct. 2606 (1993).
206. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (noting that shock-the-conscience standard
is not limited to police conduct that occurs during interrogation).
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they shock the conscience. 20 7 The Supreme Court developed this shock-the-
conscience standard in Rochin v. California.2 8 The Rochin Court held that
police behavior that would "more than offend some fastidious squeamish-
ness or private sentimentalism about combatting crime too energetically"
shocks the conscience and violates due process. 209 Although Rochin did not
207. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952) (holding that police behavior
that shocks conscience violates Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment).
208. 342 U.S. 165 (1952)
209. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). In Rochin the Supreme Court
overturned a conviction based on evidence that the police obtained in a manner that shocked
the conscience. Id. The police entered the defendant's home and forced their way into his
bedroom. Id. at 166. They asked the defendant, who was in the room, about two capsules on
a bedside table. Id. The defendant put the capsules in his mouth. Id. After unsuccessfully
trying to extract the capsules, the police officers took the defendant to the hospital and forced
him to have his stomach pumped to retrieve the capsules. Id. The defendant was convicted
for possession of morphine capsules. Id. The Supreme Court noted that the police officer's
behavior shocked the conscience and therefore violated due process. Id. at 172; see supra note
20 (quoting Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment).
In Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989), the Supreme Court heard a § 1983
claim by a plaintiff who argued that the police officer's use of excessive force while making
an arrest shocked the conscience. The Supreme Court rejected this generic substantive due
process approach to claims of excessive force, expressing a preference for identifying the
specific constitutional right infringed by the alleged excessive force, in this case the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 393-94 The Graham Court, however, specifically left open the issue of
whether the Fourth Amendment applies to pretrial detainees, including suspects whom police
interrogate, because the case did not present that issue. Id. at 395 n.10.
The Coopercourt acknowledged that the Graham decision undermines the availability of
the shock-the-conscience theory under § 1983, but decided that "[b]ecause statements of an
accused continue to be analyzed under both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and
because [the shock-the-conscience] theory of section 1983 is still viable, Cooper is entitled to
avail himself of all three theories." Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1244 n.11 (9th Cir.)
(en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 407 (1992). Other courts in post-Graham cases have analyzed
the issue differently, although little case law discusses the Graham decision's effect on the
availability of a substantive due process claim for misconduct during interrogations.
In Gonzalez v. Tilmer the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
denied the availability of the shock-the-conscience standard under § 1983 for police misconduct
during an interrogation. Gonzalez v. Tilmer, 775 F. Supp. 256, 261-62 (N.D. II1. 1991). The
plaintiff in Gonzalez claimed that the police coerced a statement from him by holding him
for 24 hours without providing food. Id. at 263. The court noted that the issue was not
whether the suspect's statement was voluntary, but whether the police violated any of the
suspect's constitutional rights by using coercion. Id. at 260. The court went on to state that
under the Due Process Clause, the relevant inquiry is not whether the interrogation was lawful,
but whether the suspect suffered physical or psychological harm inflicted during such an
interrogation. Id. at 261. The Gonzalez court rejected the shock-the-conscience standard because
Gonzalez, like the plaintiff in Graham, was securely in custody when the allegedly excessive
force occurred. Id. The Gonzalez court analyzed the claim as one of excessive force under the
Fourth Amendment's reasonableness test, which asks whether the police officers' actions are
objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 262.
The Gonzalez court criticized the Ninth Circuit's panel decision in Cooper for using the
shock-the-conscience standard. Id. at 262 n.5. In Cooper the Ninth Circuit panel declined to
use a Fourth Amendment reasonableness test because the police used little physical force
against Cooper in his arrest. Cooper v. Dupnik, -924 F.2d 1520, 1530 n.19 (9th Cir. 1991),
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involve a section 1983 suit, courts subsequently have found that police
behavior violating the Rochin standard is actionable under section 1983.210
Because the shock-the-conscience test is a substantive due process standard
applicable to all police behavior and not based in the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, violations of the standard are unconsti-
tutional standing alone.21' If the police obtain statements from a suspect in
violation of Rochin, section 1983 liability may arise regardless of whether
the prosecution makes use of the statements at trial.
212
The majority and the dissent in Cooper agreed that section 1983 liability
is available for police interrogations that shock the conscience. 213 The dispute
was whether the task force's behavior was actually so offensive as to violate
the Rochin standard. 2 4 The majority found a violation because of the
aggravating circumstances in Cooper's case. 25 The majority felt that the
task force's purpose in interrogating Cooper-to keep him from testifying
rev'd, 963 F.2d 1220 (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 407 (1992) According to the Gonzalez
court, this analysis misses the point. The Gonzalez court argued that the Graham Court did
not look to the extent of force involved; rather, the Graham Court expressed a preference for
analyzing § 1983 actions under a specific constitutional provision that protects the right
allegedly abused. Gonzalez, 775 F. Supp. at 262 n.5.
Because the force in the Gonzalez case was more psychological than physical, the court
declined to find a Fourth Amendment violation. Id. at 262. The Gonzalez court did state that
police use of psychological force might, in some circumstances, be constitutionally unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment test. Id. Although physical injury is not a prerequisite to an
excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment, the extent of injury is an important factor
in analyzing the reasonableness of the police conduct. Gumz v. Morrisette, 772 F.2d 1395,
1401 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1123 (1986). Because physical injury is not required,
if police subject a suspect to purely psychological coercion during interrogation and courts use
a Fourth Amendment standard to assess § 1983 liability, the claim will not necessarily fail.
Id. Proving such a claim under the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard should be no
more difficult than succeeding under a shock-the-conscience analysis. See E. Bryan MacDonald,
Comment, Graham v. Connor: A Reasonable Approach to Excessive Force Claims Against
Police Officers, 22 PAc. L.J. 157, 179-80 (1990) (noting that more § 1983 plaintiffs should
prevail under Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard than under substantive due process
standard).
210. See Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 588 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding § 1983 cause of
action because police behavior shocked conscience when police arrested driver of car and left
passenger alone in dangerous neighborhood where she subsequently was raped), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 341 (1990); Rutherford v. City of Berkeley, 780 F.2d 1444, 1447-48 (9th Cir. 1986)
(allowing § 1983 claim to proceed under shock-the-conscience theory when police allegedly
detained and beat suspect).
211. See Rochin, 342 U.S. at 173 (noting that court's rationale for overturning conviction
was that police methods used to obtain evidence shocked conscience, not because evidence
obtained was unreliable).
212. See Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1250 (allowing § 1983 suit to proceed for police interrogation
that shocked conscience although prosecution never used statements obtained through shocking
behavior).
213. See id. at 1255 (Brunetti, J., dissenting) (noting that § 1983 plaintiff's substantive
due process theory failed because despite majority's finding, police behavior did not shock
conscience).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1249.
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at trial and to hinder an insanity defense-was unlawful. 216 The court noted
that although the police's goal is to bring suspects to justice, they must use
legitimate methods to do so. 217 The dissent disagreed with the majority's
assessment, noting that the task force's behavior, while not commendable,
did not rise to the level of a substantive due process violation3.1
The judges' disagreement in Cooper as to whether the task force's
behavior shocked the conscience reflects the inability of courts to define
the standard adequately. 2 9 The general inquiry is whether the police mis-
conduct crossed the constitutional line.22 This inquiry is necessarily subjec-
tive and is particular to the facts of each case.?' Most section 1983 suits
for police behavior that shocks the conscience involve allegations of police
brutality.22 However, courts have found types of offensive behavior not
involving physical violence to shock the conscience as well.2
The shock-the-conscience standard is appropriate for analyzing section
1983 claims of improper police behavior during interrogation.2 Because
the inquiry focuses on the behavior of the police and not the effect of the
behavior on the suspect or resulting statements, the shock-the-conscience
standard is useful in determining what misconduct merits section 1983
216. Id. at 1250. The Cooper court distinguished the present case from Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), in which the Court allowed the prosecution to use for impeachment
purposes a statement that the police obtained with no Miranda warnings. The motive of the
task force in Cooper was to prevent Cooper from testifying at all, not just to impeach him if
he lied on the stand. In addition, the statement in Harris was not involuntary. Cooper v.
Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1249 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 407 (1992).
217. Id. at 1250.
218. Id. at 1255 (Brunetti, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that because the police did
not beat Cooper, deprive him of food or sleep, or hold him incommunicado for days, their
conduct did not shock the conscience. Id. Also, the dissent noted that the Supreme Court's
direction that courts should be reluctant to expand the reach of substantive due process applies
to this case. Id. at 1256; see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986) (declaring that
courts should not expand reach of substantive due process when possible expansion has no
cognizable roots in Constitution).
219. See Cooper v. Dupnik, 924 F.2d 1520, 1530 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that substantive
due process standards provide courts with little guidance when police misconduct is serious),
rev'd, 963 F.2d 1220 (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 407 (1992).
220. See Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 589 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that police
misconduct that crosses constitutional line violates substantive due process), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 341 (1990).
221. See Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1248 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (noting that
determination of whether behavior shocks conscience requires court to develop facts of each
case), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 407 (1992).
222. See id. at 1249 (noting that most § 1983 claims of substantive due process violations
involve allegations of police brutality).
223. See Wood, 879 F.2d at 589 (finding § 1983 cause of action because police abandoned
plaintiff in dangerous neighborhood).
224. See Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1248-49 (analyzing whether police misconduct during
interrogation shocked conscience); Loewy, supra note 33, at 935-38 (suggesting that courts
should distinguish between confessions that police merely coerce and those police obtain in
manner that shocks conscience).
1222
UNCONSTITUTIONAL INTERROGATIONS
liability.25 The main drawback is that the standard is vague and subjective. "2 6
However, if courts find, as the Cooper court did, that deliberately unlawful
police misconduct shocks the conscience, " 7 then the standard will, through
the threat of personal liability, adequately deter police from knowingly
ignoring Miranda rights or intentionally coercing confessions and will keep
their behavior in line.?5
IV. ANALYSIS
Despite the Cooper court's broad language holding that the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies to police behavior
during interrogation and not just to the prosecution's use of any obtained
statements at trial, other courts probably will interpret the decision nar-
rowly.229 The court refrained from holding that section 1983 liability should
be available every time the police ignore a suspect's invocation of Miranda
rights. In reality the holding merely finds section 1983 liability for the
coercion following the police failure to respect the suspect's request for
counsel. "30 This cause of action essentially is equivalent to the cause of
action under the Due Process Clause.? Finding a section 1983 cause of
action on both grounds is superfluous. Whether the Cooper court should
have gone further and omitted the need for police coercion following a
request for counsel in order for section 1983 liability to be available is
questionable. Although section 1983 might provide an additional deterrent
in some circumstances, courts could better accomplish deterrence through
other methods.
232
225. See Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 195 (7th Cir. 1989) (arguing that courts should
allow § 1983 suits only when police behavior during interrogation shocks conscience), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1026 (1990).
226. See Cooper v. Dupnik, 924 F.2d 1520, 1530 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that shock-the-
conscience standard provides courts with little guidance in close cases), rev'd, 963 F.2d 1220
(en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 407 (1992); Loewy, supra note 33, at 938 n.168 (quoting
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 665-66 (1961) (Black, J., concurring)) (noting that shock-the-
conscience standard is confusing and unpredictable).
227. See Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1250 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (finding that
deliberately unlawful police behavior that flouts Constitution shocks conscience), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 407 (1992).
228. Id. at 1252 (arguing that police failure to obey established law invites § 1983 suits);
Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 7, at 652 n.58 (quoting Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 21
(1980)) (noting assumption that threat of damages ha$ deterrent effect on behavior).
229. See supra notes 123-43 and accompanying text (discussing how Cooper court limited
its holding by stating that Fifth Amendment violation occurs only when coercive police behavior
follows police failure to honor request for counsel).
230. See supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text (arguing that Cooper court's focus
was on coercive police behavior rather than suspect's invocation of Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination).
231. See supra notes 144-50 and accompanying text (discussing courts' analysis of allegedly
coerced statements).
232. See supra note 14 (noting that impeachment exception to Miranda exclusionary rule
undermines deterrence of police misconduct). Abolishing the impeachment exception would be
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The Cooper decision will not change the unanimous view that section
1983 liability is not available for the mere failure of police to provide
Miranda warnings. 231 Section 1983 would provide a strong deterrent if courts
allowed a cause of action for police failure to give Miranda warnings.
4
No persuasive argument exists for allowing a section 1983dcause of action
for such behavior, because, unlike the situation in which police ignore a
suspect's invocation of Miranda rights following the warnings, the Miranda
exclusionary rule does provide a sufficient incentive for police to give the
warnings. s Police hope that the suspect will not invoke any Miranda rights
at all, which would allow the interrogation to take place.2 6 Only when the
suspect invokes those Miranda rights will the exclusionary rule fail to provide
sufficient deterrent effect.2
7
If courts interpret the Cooper decision broadly, the holding potentially
may affect situations in which the police ignore a suspect' s request for
counsel or desire to remain silent.23s The impeachment exception to the
Miranda exclusionary rule gives the police incentive to continue questioning
suspects after they invoke their right to remain silent or their right to
counsel under Miranda.u9 Without fear of section 1983 liability, police have
nothing to lose by continuing to question a suspect politely after such
invocations.m Provided that the police behavior following such invocations
is not so coercive as to make any statements obtained 'involuntary, any
confession or admission obtained will provide the prosecution with a pow-
erful impeachment tool.24'
Despite its expansive language, the Cooper court provides no further
incentive for the police to cease questioning a suspect who invokes a Miranda
a simpler way to eliminate police incentive to deliberately violate Miranda's procedural
safeguards. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 725 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting
that impeachment exception encourages police to actively question suspect following request
for counsel). i
233. See supra notes 99-107 and accompanying text (discussing courts' agreement that no
§ 1983 liability exists for police failure to give Miranda warnings).
234. See supra note 228 (noting that threat of damages deters police misconduct).
235. See supra note 48 (discussing holding of Miranda).
236. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966) (holding that suspects may
waive right to counsel and right to remain silent if they do so voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently).
237. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing impeachment exception to
Miranda exclusionary rule).
238. See supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text (discussing Cooper court's broad
interpretation of Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination).
239. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text (discussing impeachment exception to
Miranda exclusionary rule).
240. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 725 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that
even if suspect requests counsel during interrogation, police will continue questioning suspect
in hopes of obtaining statement that prosecution can use to impeach suspect's credibility at
trial).
241. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (noting that courts may not admit
involuntary statements at trial for any purpose).
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right.242 Provided that the police continue the questioning in a "benign"
way, any statement obtained likely will be voluntary and therefore admissible
for impeachment. 243 Under Cooper, police will not have to fear civil lia-
bility.2 ' A different approach would be to provide for civil liability in all
situations in which the police continue questioning suspects after their
invocation of Miranda rights. This is a step courts, including the Cooper
court, have been unwilling to take. 24 However, courts can address such
deliberately unlawful police misconduct under a section 1983 claim based
on the Due Process Clause."
Courts are split on whether coercing involuntary statements leads to
section 1983 liability. 247 Some courts state that the prosecution must use an
involuntary statement at trial before a constitutional violation exists. 24 Once
courts admit such a statement at trial, section 1983 liability is no longer an
option, and the suspect's only available remedy is to challenge a convic-
tion.249 Other courts allow plaintiffs to sue for damages, whether physical
or psychological, arising from the interrogation itself.250
Any statements the police obtain through coercion are inadmissible for
any purposes at trial, so police have no incentive to coerce suspects.25
Section 1983 cannot act as an additional deterrent. However, if the plaintiff
suffers harm during interrogation, then the exclusionary rule, which prevents
the prosecution from using the statement at trial, does not provide a
sufficient remedy. 2 2 In order for courts to redress the harm, section 1983
liability should be an option. Courts should limit such liability, however,
to circumstances in which the plaintiff suffered actual harm during ques-
242. See supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text (discussing limitation of Cooper
court's holding and its effect on police deterrence).
243. See supra notes 132-36 (noting that Cooper court's limitation on its holding that
suspect's request for counsel is invocation of Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation is problematic).
244. See supra note 137 and accompanying text (noting that even after Cooper decision,
no § 1983 liability exists when police merely fail to honor suspect's request for counsel during
interrogation).
245. See supra note 137 and accompanying text (noting that no court has found § 1983
liability for mere police failure to respect suspect's request for counsel during interrogation).
246. See supra notes 224-28 and accompanying text (discussing appropriateness of due
process shock-the-conscience standard for addressing deliberately unlawful police conduct).
247. See supra notes 159-64 and accompanying text (noting two different interpretations
of § 1983 claim for coercion under Due Process Clause).
248. See supra note 162 (citing case law supporting view that court must allow prosecution
to introduce involuntary statements at trial before constitutional violation exists).
249. See supra note 73 (discussing effects of court's admission of involuntary statement
at trial).
250. See supra notes 172-82 and accompanying text (discussing cases holding that coercion
during interrogation violates Constitution).
251. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (noting 'that courts may not admit
involuntary statements at trial for any purpose).
252. See supra notes 196-201 and accompanying text (arguing that some coercive police
behavior during interrogation is unconstitutional standing alone).
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tioning, although not necessarily only physical harm.23 The problem then
becomes determining if the police behavior is so offensive that courts should
allow section 1983 liability. 
2 4
If courts allow section 1983 suits any time the police obtain involuntary
statements, courts will be flooded with suits in which plaintiffs suffered
minimal damages. 2"1 These cases would add little additional deterrent effect
because police have no reason intentionally to coerce an inadmissible in-
voluntary statement from a suspect.2 6 A better approach is to limit section
1983 liability to police interrogations in which the methods used shock the
conscience. 2 7 This standard is appropriate because it focuses on the police
behavior, not the effect on the suspect. 2ss The problem with the shock-the-
conscience standard is that courts' determinations of what sort of police
behavior violates that standard vary greatly.0 9 If courts adopt the expansive
Cooper reading of the shock-the-conscience standard, they! would more than
adequately protect suspects from offensive police behavior. 260 In addition,
fear of section 1983 liability would deter police from acting in an offensive
manner while not unduly restraining police in their efforts to solve crimes. 26'
V. CONCLUSION
Section 1983 provides the greatest deterrence of police misconduct during
interrogations if courts clearly define the standards for constitutional viol-
ations.262 The Cooper decision illustrates that great confusion currently exists
over when civil liability is appropriate for improper interrogations. Courts
should not find section 1983 liability for mere police failure to warn suspects
of their Miranda rights because by excluding any statements obtained in
such a manner from trial, courts will safeguard the Fifth Amendment
253. See supra notes 196-201 and accompanying text (discussing need for § 1983 liability
for extremely offensive police behavior during interrogations).
254. See supra notes 219-23 and accompanying text (discussing vague substantive due
process standard courts use to analyze offensive police behavior).
255. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing courts' perception of § 1983
suits as frivolous and burdensome).
256. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (noting that courts may not admit
involuntary statements at trial for any purpose).
257. See supra notes 224-28 and accompanying text (discussing appropriateness of shock-
the-conscience standard for addressing police misconduct during interrogations).
258. See supra notes 202-06 and accompanying text (discussing need for courts to analyze
§ 1983 claims by focusing on police behavior).
259. See supra note 226 and accompanying text (discussing vagueness of shock-the-
conscience standard).
260. See supra notes 227-28 and accompanying text (noting that Cooper court's definition
of behavior that shocks conscience includes deliberately unconstitutional conduct).
261. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing courts' concern that they not
hamper police work with fear of § 1983 liability).
262. See generally Randy J. Amster, Note, Defining a Uniform Culpability Standard in
Section 1983, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 183 (1990) (arguing for uniform culpability standard in
§ 1983 actions because current standards, which vary depending on constitutional provision
implicated, cause unpredictability and confusion).
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privilege against .self-incrimination adequately. 263 Similarly, courts should
not find section 1983 liability for police failure to respect Miranda rights.
264
A danger exists that police will ignore a suspect's invocation of Miranda
rights in an effort to elicit statements that the prosecution can use to
impeach the suspect's credibility at trial. However, courts may address such
deliberately unlawful police behavior under the Due Process Clause using
the shock-the-conscience standard.
265
If the police merely coerce statements from defendants in violation of
the Due Process Clause, courts should not hold the police civilly liable.
2
6
If the police misconduct during the interrogation is offensive standing alone,
courts should address such behavior under a substantive due process anal-
ysis.267 Although the United States Supreme Court has eliminated this cause
of action in other contexts, currently this cause of action remains viable in
the context of interrogations. 26 An expansive interpretation of the shock-
the-conscience standard, as in the Cooper decision, will ensure that section
1983 liability will be available to deter police misconduct without unneces-
sarily impeding police work due to fear of personal liability.
269
JTULm E. HAWKINs
263. See supra notes 233-37 and accompanying text (arguing that no need exists for § 1983
liability for police failure to read suspect Miranda warnings during custodial interrogation).
264. See supra notes 113-22 and accompanying text (noting that Miranda right to counsel
is mere procedural safeguard).
265. See supra notes 227-28 and accompanying tekt (noting that courts can adequately
address deliberately unlawful police behavior under § 1983 claim for violation of suspect's
substantive due process rights).
266. See supra notes 189-95 and accompanying text (noting that police coercion does not
always involve unconstitutional police behavior).
267. See supra notes 189-95 and accompanying text (arguing that courts should use shock-
the-conscience standard when analyzing § 1983 claims of police misconduct during interroga-
tion).
268. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's limitation
on substantive due process theories in § 1983 context).
269. See supra notes 227-28 and accompanying text (noting that Cooper court's interpre-
tation of shock-the-conscience standard is expansive and covers deliberately unconstitutional
police behavior).
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